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Following the Swiss refusal to enter the European Economic Area (EEA),
decided by a referendum of the people in 1992,1 a package of seven sec-
toral agreements was negotiated from 1994 onwards between the European
Community and the 15 Member States of the European Union on the one
hand, and Switzerland on the other. The agreements were signed on 21 June
19992 and entered into force on 1 June 2002, after all 17 Contracting Parties
had ratified3 the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (hereafter:
AFMP).4 In Switzerland, the seven agreements were approved in a referen-
dum on 21 May 2000.5
∗ Dr.iur., Professor for European Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Basel. I am
very grateful to Anaı¨s Salvin, lic.iur. and research assistant at the Faculty of Law, University
of Basel, for her valuable help on the final version of this text.
1. The EEA Agreement of 2 May 1999 (O.J. 1994, L 1/3) was defeated narrowly, with
49.7% of the voters and seven cantons voting in favour. Cf. Breitenmoser and Husheer,
Europarecht, 2nd ed. (Zu¨rich/Basel/Geneva, 2002), vol. I, no. 31, and vol. II, no. 1306; Fasel,
“Bilaterale Vertra¨ge und ihre Auswirkungen”, (2000) Rechtsfocus, 3, 8.
2. The signing ceremony took place in Luxembourg as part of the 2-day summit of the for-
eign ministers of the EU Member States, four and a half years after the start of the negotiations
and half a year after their conclusion in Vienna in December 1998.
3. Within the EU several steps were needed for the ratification of the seven agreements:
the assent of the European Parliament (given on 4 May 2000), the approval of the Agreement
on the Free Movement of Persons by all 15 Member States (completed by Christmas 2001),
the consent of the EU Council to the seven agreements (28 Feb. 2002) and the approval by the
Commission, on behalf of the European Community on Atomic Energy (ECAE/Euratom), of
the Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation (4 April 2002).
4. According to the preamble, the Contracting Parties of the AFMP are the Swiss Confed-
eration, on the one part, and the EC and its 15 explicitly named Member States, on the other
part.
5. After the consent by the Swiss Parliament on 8 Oct. 1999, the Swiss people approved
the seven agreements by a 67.2% yes vote on 21 May 2000. Subsequently, the Agreements
were ratified by Switzerland on 16 Oct. 2000. Federal Journal (FJ) 1999, 6450, and 2000,
3773.
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In order to avoid negative economic and legal consequences of the Swiss
refusal to enter the EEA, the 1999 sectoral agreements6 deepen the relations
between the EU and Switzerland and facilitate market access for both sides.
They cover seven areas: free movement of persons,7 air transport,8 rail and
road transport,9 agriculture,10 public procurement,11 scientific and technolo-
gical cooperation12 as well as mutual recognition of conformity assessment
(technical barriers to trade).13 In the Final Acts to these agreements, both
Switzerland and the EC formulate several Joint and Unilateral Declarations
with regard to the application and further development of the agreements.
The enlargement of the EU in 200414 will necessitate amendments only of
the AFMP, in particular with regard to new transitional periods and quantit-
ative limits for the new Contracting Parties which also have to be explicitly
named in its preamble. This is a consequence of the AFMP as a mixed
agreement.15 The substantive character of such negotiations and amendments
together with a considerable extension of the applicability of the agreements
exclude the automatic integration of the new EU Member States into the
AFMP and justify a new ratification process. In the meantime, the AFMP
will remain in force among the 17 original Contracting Parties. The other six
6. They are published in the O.J. 2002, L 114/1, and in the Systematic Collection (SC) of
Swiss law under different numbers according to their context (see the footnotes below) and in
the FJ 1999, 6489–7110. The message of the Federal Council, which is the Swiss Government,
to the Parliament of 23 June 1999, FJ 1999, 6128 et seq., gives a detailed explanatory report
for each agreement.
7. Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between the European Community and
its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other part (AFMP) of
21 June 1999, O.J. 2002, L 114/6; SC 0.142.112.681; FJ 1999, 7027.
8. Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air
Transport (AAT) of 21 June 1999, O.J. 2002, L 114/73; SC 0.748.127.192.68; FJ 1999, 6948.
9. Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the
Carriage of Goods and Passengers by Rail and Road (ARR) of 21 June 1999, O.J. 2002, L
114/91; SC 0.740.72; FJ 1999, 6971.
10. Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Trade
in Agricultural Products (ATAP) of 21 June 1999, O.J. 2002, L 114/132; SC 0.916.026.81; FJ
1999, 6633.
11. Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Certain
Aspects of Government Procurement (AGP) of 21 June 1999, O.J. 2002, L 114/430; SC
0.172.052.68; FJ 1999, 6504.
12. Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation between the European Com-
munities and the Swiss Confederation (ASTC) of 21 June 1999, O.J. 2002, L 114/468; SC
0.420.513.1; FJ 1999, 6489.
13. Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual
Recognition in relation to Conformity Assessment (MRA) of 21 June 1999, O.J. 2002, L
114/369; SC 0.946.526.81; FJ 1999, 6551.
14. The Copenhagen summit of 12 and 13 Dec. 2002 fixed 1 May 2004 as accession date for
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic,
Cyprus and Slovenia; cf. Bulletin Quotidien Europe spec. No. 8362/2002.
15. See below 4.3.
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agreements, however, will be automatically extended to the new EU Mem-
ber States according to the international law principle of moving frontiers of
international treaties.16
2. The legal position of Switzerland in the process of European
integration in general
Switzerland is very close to the EU – geographically,17 economically18 and
with regard to its mixture of cultures and languages.19 In order to reduce
differences between the legal orders, the Federal Council decided in 1988
to bring Swiss legislation with international implications in line with the
European standards.20 Since that time, autonomous adaptation21 and assimil-
ation of Swiss legislation to EU regulations and standards, without any treaty
obligation, are often used and will remain important also in the future for
those matters which are not covered by the seven sectoral agreements of
1999. Within the areas of these agreements, far-reaching adoption and incor-
poration of European norms and standards (acquis communautaire) into the
Swiss legal system are to be seen in the future.22
16. With regard to the territorial scope e.g. according to Art. 57 ARR, see Epiney and
Sollberger: “Verkehrspolitische Gestaltungsra¨ume der Schweiz auf der Grundlage des Land-
verkehrsabkommens”, Swiss Papers on European Integration (SPEI), vol. 31, (Bern 2001), p.
25.
17. Neighbouring States of Switzerland are Austria, France, Germany and Italy, all EU
Member States, as well as the Principality of Liechtenstein, Contracting Party of the EEA.
18. The EU and its Member States are the main trading partners of Switzerland, absorbing
60% of the exports and supplying 80% of the imports. Merchandise exports are concentrated in
the sectors: machinery, instruments, watches, chemicals, medicinal products and commercial
services with about one quarter originating in the financial sector; cf. FJ 2003, 932. According
to Goetschel, “Switzerland and European integration: Change through distance”, (2003) EFA
Rev., 313, Switzerland is economically more integrated into the EU than many of its Member
States.
19. According to Art. 4 of Switzerland’s new Federal Constitution of 18 Dec. 1998 (SC
101), “(t)he national languages are German, French, Italian and Romansh”.
20. FJ 1988 III 388; cf. Mallepell, “Der Einfluss des Gemeinschaftsrechts auf die schwei-
zerische Gesetzgebung 1993–1995”, SPEI, vol. 21, (1999), 7 et seq., 11 et seq.
21. Application of such autonomously adapted law generally needs to be oriented towards
principles of EC law in order to ensure an interpretation result which is in conformity; cf. Wie-
gand and Bru¨lhart, “Die Auslegung von autonom nachvollzogenem Recht der Europa¨ischen
Gemeinschaft”, SPEI, vol. 23 (1999), 29 et seq., 38.
22. In order to facilitate this process, the electronic publication of binding European direct-
ives and regulations in the official systematic collection of Swiss law will be realized in autumn
2003; cf. the Federal Publication Statute of 21 March 1986 (SC 170.512). Such an accessible
official publication of the acquis communautaire also in Switzerland is necessary to satisfy the
constitutional requirements of the rule of law as well as the principle of transparency.
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In May 1992, because of an animated discussion among the political parties
about the future position of Switzerland in an integrated Europe, and during
the preparation of the referendum on accession to the EEA,23 the Swiss Gov-
ernment transmitted a request for accession to the European Union. However,
this request had to be frozen after the Swiss people voted against membership
of the EEA in a referendum of 6 December 1992.24 A people’s initiative, com-
ing from young people, to start negotiations on accession to the EU immedi-
ately, was rejected in a referendum in 2001.25 Thus, the formal links between
Switzerland and the EC before 2002, when the sectoral agreements entered
into force, remained the Free Trade Agreement with the European Economic
Community of 197226 plus some 130 treaties of mainly technical relevance,27
the Framework Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation28 and the
Transit Agreement.29
Within the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Switzerland has con-
cluded since 1991 preferential agreements with twelve central and eastern
European countries as well as with five Mediterranean countries to ensure
access conditions similar to those available to the EU.30 The EFTA Con-
vention of 4 January 1960 itself was updated as a consequence of the seven
sectoral agreements in order to ensure the analogous treatment of EFTA Mem-
23. Cf. Za¨ch, Thu¨rer and Weber (Eds.), Das Abkommen u¨ber den Europa¨ischen Wirt-
schaftsraum – Eine Orientierung (Zu¨rich, 1992); Jacot-Guillarmod (Ed.), Accord EEE – Com-
mentaires et re´flexions / EWR-Abkommen – Erste Analysen / EEA Agreement – Comments and
reflexions (Zu¨rich 1992).
24. FJ 1993 I 167. With regard to the consequences of this refusal, the Federal Council
emphasized that both the compatibility of Swiss legislation with European Community law
and EU membership would remain “strategic objectives” in the future: FJ 1992 III 1185; FJ
1993 II 805; FJ 1994 I 153, 196; FJ 2002 6359; cf. Mallepell, supra note 20, p. 14 et seq.
Therefore the Federal council refuses to withdraw the request for accession; cf. Neue Zu¨rcher
Zeitung, No. 224, 27 Sept. 2003, 14.
25. FJ 2001, 2025. As an analysis of the ballot has shown, the refusal should not be seen as
a general rejection of European integration as such, but of an immediate start of the accession
procedure. Cf. Schwok and Levrat, “Switzerland’s Relations with the EU after the Adoption
of the Seven Bilateral Agreements”, (2001) EFA Rev., 351 et seq.
26. Agreement of 22 July 1972 between the Swiss Confederation and the European Eco-
nomic Community (O.J. 1972, L 300/189; SC 0.632.401).
27. Exceptions dealing with substantial matters are the Insurance Treaty of 10 Oct. 1989
(O.J. 1991 L 205/3; SC 0.961.1) and the Agreement on Mutual Cooperation in Custom Matters
of 9 June 1997 (O.J. 1997, L 169/77; SC 0.632.401.2).
28. Agreement of 22 Nov. 1985 between the Swiss Confederation and the EC (O.J. 1985,
L 313/6; SC 0.420.518).
29. Agreement of 2 May 1992 between the Swiss Confederation and the EC (O.J. 1992, L
373/28; SC 0.740.71). According to Art. 20, this agreement will expire after 12 years, i.e. 23
Jan. 2005.
30. Cf. Reports of the Federal Council on foreign trade policy: FJ 2001, 824; FJ 2002, 1263;
FJ 2003, 865.
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ber States and their nationals. The modified version entered into force on 1
June 2002, together with the sectoral agreements.31
Beginning on 5 July 2001,32 new bilateral negotiations were resumed
between Switzerland and the EC in ten more areas.33 Seven of those areas
are so-called “left-overs” from negotiations on the sectoral agreements of
1999:34 services;35 double taxation of retired EU-civil servants pensions;36
liberalization of trade in processed agricultural products;37 environment;38
statistics;39 education, occupational training, youth;40 media.41
On the explicit wishes of Switzerland, negotiations were also commenced
on questions of cooperation and participation in the fields of the Agreements
of Schengen and Dublin.42 Moreover, negotiations were started in the fields
31. FJ 2003, 858, 865; FJ 2001, 5028; cf. FJ 2001, 6516, concerning the law on necessary
modifications of Swiss legislation, e.g. the Federal Law on the Free Movement of Medical
Staff of 19 Dec. 1877 (SC 811.11). The Federal Law on the Free Movement of Lawyers of 23
June 2000 (SC 935.61) regulates the Free Movement of Persons agreed with EFTA and EU in
its Arts. 21–33: FJ 1999, 6061 et seq.
32. I.e. before the seven sectoral agreements entered in force in June 2002.
33. FJ 2003, 862 et seq. With regard to the participation of Switzerland in the European
process of integration, the website of the Swiss Bureau of Integration www.europa.admin.ch
and the periodical “Swiss Papers on European Integration” are informative.
34. See the Joint Declarations in the Final Acts to the sectoral agreements of 1999.
35. Comprehensive liberalization of services supplementary to Art. 5 AFMP; FJ 2003, 864.
Because of several important unresolved questions, the negotiations on services were delayed;
Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, no. 42, 20 Feb. 2003.
36. FJ 2003, 863.
37. The coverage of Protocol 2 to the Free Trade Agreement should improve the frontier
price compensation mechanism for the agricultural component of products in order to enable
both parties to make the most effective possible use of the financial resources available for
export refunds: FJ 2003, 862.
38. E.g. participation of Switzerland in the European Environmental Agency (EEA), O.J.
1999 L 117, 1; FJ 2003, 863.
39. E.g. participation of Switzerland in Eurostat: O.J. 1997, L 52/1; FJ 2003, 863.
40. Access for young Swiss to the EU programmes SOKRATES (general education), O.J.
2000, L 28/1; LEONARDO DA VINCI (occupational training), O.J. 1999, L 146/33; YOUTH
(extracurricular youth work), O.J. 2000, L 117/1; FJ 2003, 863.
41. Cooperation in the area of media and opening of the EU programmes for the advance-
ment of media, such as “MEDIA Plus”, O.J. 2000, L 336/82, and “MEDIA Training”, O.J.
2001, L 26/1, for Switzerland; FJ 2003, 863.
42. Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the Gradual Abolition of Controls at Common Frontiers,
O.J. 2000, L 239/13 (Schengen I Convention); Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement
1990, O.J. 2000, L 239/19 (Schengen II Convention); Convention Determining the State
Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in one of the Member States of
the European Communities, O.J. 1997, C 254/1 (Dublin Convention); FJ 2003, 863 et seq. A
special consultation mechanism will apply, at Switzerland’s request, if new EU law relevant for
Schengen might concern Swiss fundamental principles like neutrality, federalism and direct
democracy. In that case a joint Committee shall find appropriate solutions, Press release of the
Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police, 30 June 2003.
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of combat of fraud43 and, after the decision of the European Council at
the summit of Feira of 20 June 2000, taxation of savings income.44 Espe-
cially in connection with these dossiers, questions regarding the Swiss bank
secrecy as well as administrative and judicial assistance come to the fore more
and more.45 In this respect, Switzerland supports the European taxation of
interest payments with an “equivalent” paying agent tax. However, a system
for an automatic exchange of information between tax authorities is refused
by Switzerland, because of the banking secrecy.46 The latter does not pro-
tect criminal activities, which means that it can be lifted for the purpose of
combatting fraud. By strengthening mutual judicial and administrative assist-
ance procedures in such cases, Switzerland wants to emphasize that it has
no interest in the use of its territory and its banks for the organization of
illegal activities. Problems arise, however, as a result of the lack of a uniform
definition of offences, primarily in the fields of fraud, tax evasion and money
laundering.
3. Legal nature and structure of the sectoral agreements
3.1. The sectoral agreements as part of international law
3.1.1. Legal nature and Contracting Parties
In colloquial language, and sometimes even in legal writing, the seven
sectoral agreements are called “Bilateral Agreements between the EU and
Switzerland”.47 This qualification is incorrect for two reasons: first, the EU
still has no international legal personality,48 but needs the EC, represented by
43. FJ 2003, 862.
44. Bull. EU, No. 6/2000, p. 9 et seq.; FJ 2003, 864. Original deadline for the EC according
to the conclusions of the European Council of Feira of June 2000 was the end of the year 2002.
45. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. I, no. 843 et seq.
46. See now the decisions of ECOFIN of 21 Jan. 2003 and 3 June 2003 with regard to
the negotiations with Switzerland: Bulletin Quotidien Europe, No. 8384/2003, p. 7, and No.
8475/2003, p. 6.
47. Cottier and Panizzon, “Die bilateralen Vertra¨ge und das Recht der WTO: Grundla-
gen und Spannungsfelder”, Jusletter 11 Sept. 2000, www.weblaw.ch/jusletter/Artikel.jsp?
ArticleNr=740&-Language=1; Felder and Kaddous (Eds.), Accords bilate´raux Suisse –
EU (Commentaires) / Bilaterale Abkommen Schweiz – EU (Erste Analysen) (Basel/
Geneva/Munich/Brussels, 2001); Thu¨rer, Weber and Za¨ch (Eds.), Bilaterale Vertra¨ge Schweiz
– EG, Ein Handbuch (Zu¨rich, 2002). Also the official explanations by the Federal Council
in the information brochure for the plebiscite of 21 May 2000 as well as the foreign policy
commission of the Swiss Parliament use this term; FJ 2002, 6334 et seq.; Schwok and Levrat,
supra note 25, p. 335, use a mixed term, namely “sector-specific Bilateral Agreements”.
48. Such a proposal was last refused in the negotiations on the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997
and has now been made again by the European Convention (Art. 6). Cf. also Breitenmoser and
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the European Commission, to negotiate and to sign agreements falling within
its competences.49 Second, only five of the seven agreements are bilateral, i.e.
only binding two subjects of international law.50 The Agreement on Scientific
and Technological Cooperation is a trilateral treaty between Switzerland, the
EC and Euratom, and the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons is a
mixed agreement, i.e. a multilateral agreement between Switzerland, the EC
and the EU Member States.51 Consequently, this agreement had to be ratified
not only by the EC, but also by all 15 Member States of the EU with the
involvement of their parliaments.52 The necessity to conclude the Agreement
on the Free Movement of Persons as a mixed agreement results from the fact
that the EC is not exclusively competent with regard to free movement of
persons, but shares competence with its Member States.53 The EU Member
Isler, “Der Rechtsschutz im Personenfreizu¨gigkeitsabkommen zwischen der Schweiz und der
EG sowie den EU-Mitgliedstaaten”, (2002) Aktuelle Juristische Praxis, 1005; Craig and de
Bu´rca, EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials”, 2nd ed. (Oxford, New York, 1998), p. 116 et seq.;
Herdegen, Europarecht, 3rd ed. (Mu¨nchen, 2002), no. 82 et seq.; Streinz, Europarecht, 5th ed.
(Heidelberg, 2001), no. 121b; Ro¨ttinger, “Art. 281”, in Lenz (Ed.) EG-Vertrag Kommentar,
2nd ed. (Cologne, 1999), no. 6; Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of
the European Communities”, 3rd ed. (London/The Hague/Boston, 1998), p. 47, 97, 100, 1254;
Tizzano, “The foreign relations law of the EU between Supranationality and Intergovernmental
Model”, in Cannizzaro (Ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (The
Hague/London/New York, 2002), p. 143 et seq. Other opinion held by Wichard, “Art. 1 EG-
Vertrag”, no. 5–14, “Art. 5 EU-Vertrag”, no. 8, and Cremer, “Art. 11 EU-Vertrag”, no. 1, “Art.
18 EU-Vertrag”, no. 1, both in Calliess and Ruffert (Eds.), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und
EG-Vertrag, 2nd ed. (Neuwied/Kriftel, 2002); Tomuschat, “The International Responsibility
of the European Union”, in Cannizzaro, p. 181 et seq.
49. Arts. 133(3) and 300(1) EC. See e.g. Craig and de Bu´rca, supra note 48, p. 118,
Herdegen, supra note 48, no. 138, 439 et seq.; Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, supra note
48, p. 1265 et seq.; Streinz, supra note 48, no. 300, 600 et seq.
50. Cf. the agreements on air, rail and road transport, agriculture, mutual recognition of
conformity assessment and public procurement. Thu¨rer and Hillemanns, “Allgemeine Prin-
zipien”, in Thu¨rer, Weber and Za¨ch, supra note 47, p. 17 et seq.; another view is held by
Neframi, who thinks that the Community and the Member States form a single Contracting
Party: “International Responsibility of the European Community and the Member States under
Mixed Agreements”, in Cannizzaro, supra note 48, p. 193.
51. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1235. See in general Gas-
ser, “Grundsa¨tzliche Charakteristik des Abkommens u¨ber die Freizu¨gigkeit”, in Felder and
Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 273; Herdegen, supra note 48, no. 440; Craig and de Bu´rca, supra
note 48, p. 117 et seq.; Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, supra note 48, p. 1262 et seq.;
Nicolaysen, Europarecht II – Das Wirtschaftsrecht im Binnenmarkt (Baden-Baden, 1996), p.
487 et seq.; Ro¨ttinger “Art. 300”, in Lenz, supra note 48, no. 6; Schmalenbach, “Art. 300
EG-Vertrag”, in Calliess and Ruffert, supra note 48, no. 25 et seq.; Streinz, supra note 48, no.
428 et seq.
52. Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations
of the European Community and its Member States (The Hague/London/New York, 2001), p.
86 et seq.
53. Cf. Opinion 1/1994, WTO, [1994] ECR I-5267, para 108. Heliskoski supra note 52, p.
25 et seq.
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States claim parallel competence in the field of social policy, which is directly
linked to free movement of persons.54
Despite their legal notions and substantive concepts, which are taken from
the European common market and which are identical with the acquis com-
munautaire at the date of signature in the matters concerned, the seven sectoral
agreements are, in principle, treaties governed by public international law.55
This is confirmed by the institutional and reciprocal framework and structure
of the agreements. Therefore, with regard to their general functioning, they
have to be applied and interpreted in the light of general principles of public
international law such as reciprocity and territorial sovereignty and accord-
ing to the Vienna Convention on Treaties.56 With regard to the substantive
content which is part of the acquis communautaire, however, application and
interpretation have to follow the rules and standards set by the European insti-
tutions, especially by the European Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance. In this respect, their implication for Swiss law and effect in legal
practice may be characterized as partly integrational or sui generis.
From the point of view of EC law, the sectoral agreements are association
agreements in the sense of Article 310 EC.57 Although this provision was not
listed as a legal basis in the proposal of the Commission to the Council con-
54. The variety of areas of activities that an international agreement covers does not neces-
sarily reflect or correspond with the division of powers set out in the EC Treaty; in agreements
with various and complex matters, the concept of mixity is often unavoidable: see Koutrakos,
“The Interpretation of Mixed Agreements under the Preliminary Reference Procedure”, (2002)
EFA Rev., 27 et seq., 30.
55. FJ 1999, 6157. Cf. Felder, “Appre´ciation juridique et politique du cadre institutionnel
et des dispositions ge´ne´rales des accords sectoriels”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p.
125 and 130; Filliez, “Application des accords sectoriels par les juridictions suisses: quelques
repe`res”, in Felder and Kaddous, ibid., p. 184 et seq.; Za¨ch, “Gesamtu¨berblick”, in Thu¨rer,
Weber and Za¨ch, supra note 47, p. 6.; Thu¨rer and Hillemanns, supra note 50, p. 18. Another
view is held by Cottier and Evtimov, “Die sektoriellen Abkommen der Schweiz mit der EG:
Anwendung und Rechtsschutz”, in (2003) Zeitschrift des bernischen Juristenvereins, 106 et
seq., who characterize the sectoral agreements as being sui generis because of their combination
of public international and European law.
56. See below section 3.1.5.; Filliez, supra note 55, p. 201 et seq.; cf. with regard to
association agreements in general Herrnfeld, “Art. 310”, in Schwarze (Ed.), EU-Kommentar
(Baden-Baden, 2000), p. 2420, no. 16.
57. Cf. e.g. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1257 et seq.; Cottier
and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 95; Kahil-Wolff and Mosters, “Struktur und Anwendung
des Freizu¨gigkeitsabkommens Schweiz-EG”, in Schaffhauser and Schu¨rer (Eds.), Die
Durchfu¨hrung des Abkommens EU/CH u¨ber die Personenfreizu¨gigkeit (Teil Soziale Sicher-
heit) in der Schweiz, vol. I, (St. Gallen, 2001), p. 9 et seq., 18. Other view in FJ 2002, 6332
et seq.; Kaddous, “Les accords sectoriels dans le syste`me des relations exte´rieures de l’Union
europe´enne”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 90 et seq.; Andreoli, “Drittstaats-
angeho¨rige in der Europa¨ischen Union”, SPEI, vol. 22, (1999), p. 59. See about association
agreements in general Craig and de Bu´rca, supra note 48, p. 115 et seq.; Herdegen, supra
note 48, no. 452 et seq.; Herrnfeld, supra note 56, p. 2412 et seq.; Kapteyn and VerLoren
van Themaat, supra note 48, p. 1330 et seq.; Koutrakos, supra note 54, p. 33; Nicolaysen,
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cerning the conclusion of the seven agreements,58 the Commission specified
in its explanatory report to the proposal that, in view of the package charac-
ter of the agreements and their institutional provisions,59 the consent of the
European Parliament according to Article 300(3)(2) EC was necessary.60 A
further consequence of the qualification of the sectoral agreements as associ-
ation agreements was the requirement of a unanimous decision of the Council
according to Article 300(2)(1) EC.61
3.1.2. The sectoral agreements as an integral part of Swiss and EC law
Both in Switzerland62 and the EU,63 treaties of international law are auto-
matically part of the legal order upon their entry into force and are therefore
ipso iure binding for all administrative and judicial bodies.64 Both legal
orders accept the predominance of the so-called “monistic theory”, according
supra note 51, p. 517 et seq.; Ro¨ttinger, “Art. 310”, in Lenz, supra note 48, no. 2 et seq.;
Schmalenbach, “Art. 310 EG-Vertrag”, in Calliess and Ruffert, supra note 48, no. 1 et seq.,
11; Streinz, supra note 48, no. 613 et seq.
58. COM(1999) 229 final, 14; cf. Cottier and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 96; Schmalenbach,
supra note 57, no. 2 and 13.
59. Cf. Za¨ch, supra note 55, p. 7. Epiney, “Gestaltungsra¨ume schweizerischer Verkehrs-
politik dargestellt am Beispiel der Erhebung von Strassenbenutzungsgebu¨hren”, in Jusletter 6
May 2002, www.weblaw.ch/jusletter/Artikel.jsp? Article Nr=1644&Language=1, no. 4. Fasel,
supra note 1, p. 15, analyses the reasons for the choice of the package character and calls the
position of the EC on this point uncompromising. In fact the package character was chosen
by the EC in order to avoid a refusal of some of the agreements in the Swiss plebiscite; cf.
COM(1999) 229 of 4 May 1999, in (1999) Zeitschrift fu¨r Europarecht, 95 et seq.; see also
Toledano Laredo, “The EEA Agreement: an overall view”, 29 CML Rev., 1201, who points
out that the procedure of Art. 310 EC is close to former Art. 237 EC (now Art. 49 TEU) for
the accession of new Member States.
60. Cf. Cottier and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 96; Schmalenbach, supra note 51, no. 34;
Schmalenbach, supra note 57, no. 17.
61. Cf. Schmalenbach, supra note 51, no. 29; Schmalenbach, supra note 57, no. 17. The
Treaty of Nice does not change the regulations of Art. 300 EC in a way that is relevant for the
sectoral agreements. Art. 310 EC was neither changed in itself nor modified by the new Art.
181a EC. See Fischer, Der Vertrag von Nizza (Baden-Baden, 2001), p. 128 et seq., p. 155.
62. Judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (hereafter: “FT”) 124 II 307. It is unwritten
constitutional law: Achermann, “Der Vorrang des Vo¨lkerrechts”, in Cottier, Achermann, Wu¨ger
and Zellweger (Eds.), Der Staatsvertrag im schweizerischen Verfassungsrecht (Bern, 2001),
p. 33 et seq., 38; Thu¨rer, “Verfassungsrecht und Vo¨lkerrecht”, in Thu¨rer, Aubert and Mu¨ller
(Eds.), Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz (Zu¨rich, 2001), para 11 no. 23; Filliez, supra note 55, p.
184 et seq.
63. Art. 300(7) EC. Case 181/73, Haegemann v. Belgian State II, [1974] ECR 449 para
5; Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg & Cie., [1982] ECR 3641 para 14; Case
C-162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, [1998] ECR I-3655 para 46. Cf. Herdegen, supra note
48, no. 75; Schmalenbach, supra note 51, no. 48 et seq., 51 et seq., 68 et seq.; Schmalenbach,
supra note 57, no. 34; Streinz, supra note 48, no. 431, 605 et seq.
64. In the EU, these agreements form an integral part of Community Law and are binding
both for EC institutions as well as for EU Member States. Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt
Schwa¨bisch Gmu¨nd, [1987] ECR 3719 para 7; Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol.
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to which international law and national law together are part of one leg-
al order, which is deduced from one basis, and where the addressees are the
individuals.65 Due to this unity, international law is automatically and directly
adopted by the way of reception in Swiss and Community law.66 Therefore,
an additional implementation of the sectoral agreements into the legal order
of Switzerland or the EU by way of transformation or incorporation, as would
be the case in dualistic countries and systems,67 is not necessary.
3.1.3. The direct effect of the sectoral agreements
In order to be invoked and applied directly a treaty provision, as well as a
decision of the Joint Committees of an EC association treaty, have to be duly
published, but also have to be formulated in clear and precise wording. These
requirements make a provision justiciable, i.e. self-executing. According to the
jurisprudence of the ECJ as well as of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, provisions
of a treaty are self-executing and thus have direct effect if they are sufficiently
clear and precise to constitute a valid legal basis for a decision in an individual
case.68 There is no direct effect if a provision just contains indefinite and
programmatic goals, governs a matter in outline, gives substantial room for
discretion or merely contains guiding principles. Such provisions are not
I, no. 319; Herdegen, supra note 48, no. 454; Kaddous, supra note 57, p. 99 et seq.; Ro¨ttinger,
“Art. 300”, supra note 51, no. 16; Schmalenbach, supra note 57, no. 7 et seq.
65. In order to be held binding on individuals, a treaty also requires publication. Cf. Wild-
haber and Breitenmoser, “The Relationship between Customary International Law and Muni-
cipal Law in Western European Countries”, (1988) Zao¨RV, 197.
66. Cf. Wildhaber and Breitenmoser, supra note 65, 171; Herdegen, supra note 48, no. 75;
Streinz, supra note 48, no. 431.
67. The non-requirement of transformation law is also called the theory of adoption. Wild-
haber and Breitenmoser, supra note 65, p. 171, 197; Mu¨ller and Wildhaber, Praxis des
Vo¨lkerrechts, 3rd ed. (Bern, 2001), p. 153 et seq.; Thu¨rer and Hillemanns, supra note 50,
p. 20.
68. Haegemann II, supra note 63; Kupferberg & Cie., supra note 63; Demirel, supra note 64;
Case C-192/89, Sevince, [1990] ECR I-3461/3500; Case 87/75, Bresciani, [1976] ECR 129;
Cases 21–24/72, International Fruit Company NV and others v. Produktschap voor Groenten
en Fruit, [1972] ECR 1219; FT 124 III 91; FT 120 Ia 10 et seq.; FT 111 Ib 164; FT 98 Ib 388;
cf. Bucher, “Rechtsmittel der Versicherten”, in Schaffhauser and Schu¨rer supra note 57, no. 7,
12 et seq.; Hangartner, “Art. 5 – Grundsa¨tze rechtsstaatlichen Handelns”, in Ehrenzeller, Mas-
tronardi, Schweizer and Vallender (Eds.), Die schweizerische Bundesverfassung – Kommentar
(Zu¨rich/ Basel/Geneva, 2002), p. 54 no. 42; Kahil-Wolff, “Im APF nicht geregelte Fragen des
Rechtsschutzes”, in Schaffhauser and Schu¨rer (Eds.), Rechtsschutz der Versicherten und der
Versicherer gema¨ss Abkommen EU/CH u¨ber die Personenfreizu¨gigkeit (APF) im Bereich der
Sozialen Sicherheit, p. 77; Ro¨ttinger, “Art. 300”, supra note 51, no. 17; Ro¨ttinger, supra note
57, no. 4; Schmalenbach, supra note 51, no. 59 et seq.; Thu¨rer and Hillemanns, supra note 50,
p. 22 et seq.; Streinz, supra note 48, no. 432 et seq., 644; Wildhaber and Breitenmoser, supra
note 65, p. 172. The question of self-executing-character and justiciability of a provision or a
decision has to be answered for each individual provision and decision separately, not for a
treaty or decision mechanism as such: Mu¨ller and Wildhaber, supra note 67, p. 182 et seq.;
Cottier and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 95.
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directed towards administrative and judicial bodies and, therefore, have no
direct application and execution. They are directed towards the legislature
with its discretion, its legislative and political competences.69
With regard to the direct effect of treaty provisions, the recent case law
of the Swiss Federal Tribunal has not been constant. The judgments on the
Free Trade Agreement between Switzerland and the EEC of 1972,70 which
led to this Free Trade Agreement being almost completely ineffective, have
been widely criticized by legal scholars.71 On the other hand, the Federal
Tribunal has already decided earlier in a judgment on the EFTA Agreement72
that its Article 16(1) has self-executing character.73 The Federal Tribunal
has not abandoned this precedent even after the contrary signal given in its
judgments on the Free Trade Agreement.74 With respect to the question of
direct effect of provisions of the WTO Agreement, no final judgments of the
Federal Tribunal exist yet: the question has been left open so far75 or was
answered in the negative,76 whereas in both judgments, the relevant passages
were only so-called obiter dicta.
In the AFMP, most provisions on free movement of employees and freedom
of establishment according to the provisions in Annex I are self-executing;77
only the provisions on coordination of the systems of social security in Annex
II78 are non-self-executing.79 Article 1(1) of Annex II AFMP, declaring the
69. Case C-469/93, Chiquita Italia, [1995] ECR I-4533; FT 124 II 308, with further refer-
ences; FT 105 II 58; FT 98 Ib 387.
70. Agreement of 22 July 1972 between the Swiss Confederation and the European Eco-
nomic Community, O.J. 1972, L 300/189; SC 0.632.401.
71. On this not convincing jurisprudence of the Federal Tribunal see FT 118 Ib 367 et seq.;
FT 105 II 49 et seq.; Breitenmoser, “Die globale und regionale Interdependenz des schwei-
zerischen Aussenwirtschaftsrechts”, in Cottier and Kospe (Eds.), Der Beitritt der Schweiz zur
Europa¨ischen Union, Brennpunkte und Auswirkungen (Zu¨rich, 1998), p. 49 et seq., 57, with
further references.
72. Agreement of 4 Jan. 1960 on the Establishment of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), SC 0.632.31.
73. FT 98 Ib 387 et seq.
74. FT 116 Ib 302 et seq. However, the rules of origin as provided for in the 3rd Protocol
to the Free Trade Agreement were applied in a direct manner: FT 114 Ib 168; cf. Cottier and
Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 102.
75. FT 2A.496/1996, unpublished judgment of 14 July 1997, para 4.
76. FT 125 II 306.
77. FJ 1999, 6358; cf. Grossen and de Pale´zieux, “Abkommen u¨ber die Freizu¨gigkeit”, in
Thu¨rer, Weber and Za¨ch, supra note 47, p. 107, 134; Gasser, supra note 51, p. 274 et seq.;
Ka¨lin, “Die Bedeutung des Freizu¨gigkeitsabkommens fu¨r das Ausla¨nderrecht”, in Cottier and
Oesch (Eds.), Die sektoriellen Abkommen Schweiz-EG (Bern, 2002), p. 19.
78. Cf. Bergmann, “ ¨Uberblick u¨ber die Regelungen des APF betreffend die Soziale Sicher-
heit”, in Schaffhauser and Schu¨rer, supra note 57, p. 12 et seq.
79. See FJ 1999, 6358 et seq.; Spira, “L’application de l’Accord sur la libre circulation des
personnes par le juge des assurances sociales”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 369
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EC provisions on coordination80 and other equivalent provisions in the area
of social security to be applicable, leaves the detailed definition and concrete
regulation in the individual branches of social security to Swiss legislation.
Yet, in this context, it is not correct to speak of an incorporation or a trans-
formation of these provisions of the AFMP into Swiss law,81 as in monism
international law does not need incorporation or transformation. The norms
of Annex II of the AFMP do not have to be incorporated or transformed into
Swiss law, in the sense of the dualistic theory, but only need clarification,
implementation and specification by further norms and statutes in order to be
applicable in individual cases. To this end, a clause will be inserted in all rel-
evant federal social security laws, declaring Council Regulations No. 1408/71
and No. 574/72 in effect for Switzerland, to be binding through a reference.82
Even if there was no reference to the EC Council Regulations in a statute, this
would not mean that a precise provision of the AFMP or its Annex I does not
have a self-executing effect, since the prohibition of discrimination in Article
2 of this Agreement is self-executing.83 This is also true for Article 3 of the
Agreement on Air Transport (AAT). These discrimination clauses provide for
immediate legal protection against unfair discrimination, even in the cases of
a legislative mistake or a failure to enact a law. However, since the discrim-
et seq.; Mu¨ller, “Soziale Sicherheit”, in Thu¨rer, Weber and Za¨ch, supra note 47,, p. 145. Other
view: Bucher, supra note 68, no. 17 et seq., 23.
80. In particular Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application
of social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to the members
of their families moving within the Community, O.J. 1971, L 149/2, with the subsequent
amendments; most recently changed by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1386/2001 of 5 June
2001 on the amendment of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 and Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 574/72 on the execution of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71, O.J. 2001, L
187/1 et seq. (not yet considered in the AFMP). The principle of applying only one security
system to one worker and all not gainfully employed members of his family, as well as a
general inclusion within the social security system of the State where the working place is
situated can be seen as fundamental elements of the new arrangement. Another basic structure
is that benefits are due also when a person finally leaves the country and that earlier periods of
insurance elsewhere in a Contracting State must be taken into consideration when changing a
social security system. In the field of health insurance, some countries like Germany, Austria
and Italy have accorded a right to opt for an insurance of the residence State to frontier workers,
which had to be exercised within three months of the coming into force of the agreements. FJ
1999, 6153 et seq.
81. Cf. FJ 1999, 6358.
82. See paras. 4–12 of the Federal Law on the Agreement between the EC, their Member
States and Switzerland on the Free Movement of Persons, SC 142.20, FJ 1999, 6456 et seq.;
cf. Schu¨rer, “Einzelne Regelungen gema¨ss APF”, in Schaffhauser and Schu¨rer, supra note 57,
p. 81 et seq.; Kahil-Wolff, “Quelques remarques sur les voies de droit en matie`re de se´curite´
sociale dans le cadre de l’Accord sur la Libre Circulation des Personnes (ALCP)”, (2002)
Journal des Tribunaux, 64.
83. Similarly: Imhof, “Das bilaterale Abkommen u¨ber den freien Personenverkehr und die
Soziale Sicherheit”, (2000) Schweizerische Zeitschrift fu¨r Sozialversicherung und berufliche
Vorsorge, 22 et seq.; Kahil-Wolff, supra note 82, p. 66; Bergmann, supra note 78, p. 46.
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ination clauses of Article 6 of the Agreement on Public Procurement (APP)
and Article 1(3) of the Agreement on Rail and Road Transport (ARR) are
only directed towards the Contracting Parties, requiring them not to take any
discriminatory measures, these clauses have no self-executing character.84
3.1.4. The rank of the sectoral agreements in Swiss and EC law
Since international treaties are not drafted and enacted in the same proceedings
as national legislation, they sometimes do not fit coherently into the system of
national law. As a consequence, there may arise conflicts between national and
international law. Such collisions, their effects and resulting complications
in interpretation make the controversial questions about the rank and the
priority of international law sources within a national legal system all the
more important.85 Only if a self-executing provision of a treaty has priority
over national law, can it be fully enforced by administrative and judicial
bodies of the Contracting States.
In Switzerland, the Federal State as well as the Cantons have to respect inter-
national law according to Article 5(4) of the Federal Constitution.86 Despite
its open and indefinite character,87 this provision can, in reference to the rule
of law principle, stated in Article 5(1) of the Constitution, be interpreted as an
implicit recognition of the general principle that international law has priority
over national law, or that the latter must be interpreted in conformity with
international law, in both cases with the reservation of deviant case law of the
Federal Tribunal.88 Also, in accordance with the international customary law
principles pacta sunt servanda and non-consideration of national regulations
that are opposed to international obligations, as provided for in Article 26 and
84. Other opinion held by Epiney and Sollberger, supra note 16, p. 22.
85. The theory of adoption does not deal with the hierarchical position of international law
within the legal order, but accepts conflicts; cf. Achermann, supra note 62, p. 37 et seq.
86. See Hangartner, supra note 68, p. 51 no. 4, p. 63 et seq.
87. Biaggini, “Das Verha¨ltnis der Schweiz zur internationalen Gemeinschaft, Neuerungen
im Rahmen der Verfassungsreform”, in (1999) Aktuelle Juristische Praxis / Pratique Juridique
Actuelle, 722 et seq., 728; Hangartner, supra note 68, p. 51 no. 4, p. 63 et seq.
88. Nothing can be concluded from the limitation of the margin of appreciation of the Federal
Tribunal according to Art. 191 of the Federal Constitution with respect to the relationship
between international and national law. The provision only states that international law has
to be taken into consideration and must be applied, whereas no general decision upon a
hierarchy of norms is made. The message of the Federal Council on the new Constitution
explicitly confirms this: FJ 1997, 136 et seq.; cf. Hangartner, “Art. 191: Massgebendes Recht”,
in Ehrenzeller, Mastronardi, Schweizer and Vallender, supra note 68, note 16 et seq; see also
Thu¨rer and Hillemanns, supra note 50, p. 21 et seq., who consider that an inflexible general
rule would not be appropriate to the dynamic character of international law; for Filliez, supra
note 55, p. 191 et seq., no rule of conflict is contained in the Article and the courts may still
decide according to recognized doctrine and practice.
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Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,89 Switzerland is,
according to its own international law commitments, obliged to comply with
international treaty law.90
Still, the relation between international and national law has not yet been
fully clarified by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.91 According to constant preced-
ents, national law generally has to be interpreted in a way which is consistent
with international law and its public order.92 This is called interpretation
favouring international law (vo¨lkerrechtskonforme Auslegung) and may be
seen as an expression of the principle of friendliness to international law
(Vo¨lkerrechtsfreundlichkeit). Included in these rules is a presumption that
the legislature did not intend to derogate from international law and that
it therefore wished to avoid a conflict between international and municipal
law whenever possible.93 But if the conflict of norms can not be solved by
this method, precedence must be given to international law.94 With regard
to human rights norms, this principle of superiority has now been explicitly
accepted by the Federal Tribunal.95
Insofar as the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the sectoral agreements
and the EC Treaty may be treated as being equal to basic human rights,96
they should also have priority over Swiss law. Yet, the guarantees of these
fundamental freedoms demand citizenship of the Union and a transnational
relation, whereas human rights do not. These differences between fundament-
al freedoms and human rights are, however, the only ones and they do not
play a role in this context. Therefore, the free movement and establishment
89. Hereafter: VCT. The seven sectoral agreements being part of public international law
fall under the scope of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, SC
0.111; see supra 3.1.1. and infra 3.1.5.
90. FT 117 Ib 372 et seq.; Filliez, supra note 55, p. 185; Mu¨ller and Wildhaber, supra note
67, p. 73. The same is true for the European Communities, see below in this section.
91. Achermann, supra note 62, gives a survey of recent precedents.
92. This principle goes back to the Frigerio judgment of the Federal Tribunal: FT 94 I 669
et seq. See also FT 112 II 13. Cf. Filliez, supra note 55, p. 201 et seq.
93. Wildhaber and Breitenmoser, supra note 65, p. 169.
94. This is called moderate monism with priority of national law. Mu¨ller and Wildhaber,
supra note 67, p. 161 et seq.
95. FT 125 II 425; see already FT 119 V 177. The so-called “Schubert practice” (FT 99 Ib
39 et seq.), dating back to the year 1973, which allows the legislature under certain conditions
to enact provisions that are in conflict with international law, has therefore become obsolete
in this area. The Federal Tribunal left open whether such priority has also to be given to other
norms. Cf. Filliez, supra note 55, p. 188 et seq.; Thu¨rer and Hillemans, supra note 50, p. 21 et
seq.
96. See e.g. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association ASBL
v. Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921 et seq. para 129; Case C-416/96, Eddline El-Yassini, [1999]
ECR I-1209 et seq., para 45; Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 934, 1087 and
1362; Schindler, Die Kollision von Grundfreiheiten und Gemeinschaftsgrundrechten (Berlin,
2001), p. 73 et seq.
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of persons guaranteed in Articles 39 and 43 EC and in the AFMP could be
treated as being equal to a basic human right.97 As a consequence, to the
extent that the freedoms guaranteed by the AFMP are equal or similar to
basic human rights, the priority of the AFMP over federal and cantonal law
in Switzerland would arguably be ensured, according to the case law of the
Federal Tribunal.98
In the EU, on the other hand, international agreements have a rank between
primary and secondary EC law, whereas the priority of primary Community
law derives from the fact that compatibility with primary EC law is required.99
From the point of view of international law, however, internal law may never
derogate from the general priority of international law100 and pacta sunt ser-
vanda must be respected. The ECJ consequently declares that international
law has priority over secondary EC law within the Community legal order.101
It follows that EC secondary legislation has to be interpreted in conformity
with international law.102 The same goes for national rules which are not com-
patible with international law obligations of the Community.103 This constant
case law may not hide the fact that the ECJ has very rarely, so far, judged
a national regulation to be contrary to international law.104 Furthermore, on
only one occasion has the CFI found EC secondary legislation incompatible
with the international law duties of the Community.105
3.1.5. The interpretation of the sectoral agreements
With regard to the interpretation of the sectoral agreements by the Contract-
ing Parties and their institutions and courts, the following distinction must
be made: in general and concerning their institutional functioning, the sec-
toral agreements are treaties of international law. As such, they have to be
97. The counterpart is the freedom of settlement in Art. 24(1) of the Federal Constitution,
which only applies to Swiss nationals, according to the wording of the Constitution. Cf.
regarding this parallelism Zufferey, “La liberte´ d’e´tablissement”, in Thu¨rer, Aubert and Mu¨ller,
supra note 62, para 47 no. 9.
98. FT 125 II 425; see already FT 119 V 177. Cf. Bergmann, supra note 78, p. 46.
99. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1230; Herdegen, supra note 48, no.
605; Herrnfeld, supra note 56, p. 2422, no. 18.; Streinz, supra note 48, no. 167 et seq.
100. Cf. Art. 27 VCT. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1231. Herrnfeld,
supra note 56,, p. 2422, no. 18.
101. See the related Cases International Fruit Company NV and others, supra note 68.
102. Case C-341/95, Bettati v. Safety Hi-Tech, [1998] ECR I-4355 para 20; Case C-284/95,
Safety Hi-Tech v. S. & T., [1998] ECR I-4301 para 22; Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany,
[1996] ECR I-3989 para 52. With respect to the ECJ’s review of Community legislation against
directly effective international law see also supra 3.1.3.
103. Kupferberg, supra note 63, para 14.
104. Cf. e.g. Commission v. Germany, supra note 102, para 18 et seq.; Case C-469/93,
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Chiquita Italia SpA, [1995] ECR I-4533, para 54
et seq.
105. Case T-115/94, Opel Austria GmbH v. Commission, [1997] ECR II-39, para 122 et seq.
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interpreted according to the binding guidelines and principles of Articles
31–33 VCT. In the foreground are grammatical, systematic and teleological
interpretations (Art. 31 VCT).106 That means that the sectoral agreements are
not to be interpreted in the same extensive manner as the ECJ and the CFI
do in the context of the supranational character of Community Law, which
must be distinguished from traditional public international law.107 Thus, the
ECJ and the CFI often and extensively apply the principle of effet utile,108
according to which the effectiveness of the EC treaty has to be ensured to the
largest possible extent.109 Such “a rule of teleological interpretation which
would give a treaty text the most extensive possible meaning and effect is
neither recognized nor acceptable in international law and relations.”110 The
international community, in contrast to the European Community, still lacks
homogeneous structures, which is why the principle of effectiveness and effet
utile was not explicitly mentioned in Article 31 VCT, even though this had
been proposed.111
However, this conclusion has to be modified due to the static references
to the relevant acquis communautaire contained in the sectoral agreements,
that acquis being developed by the ECJ with reference to the effet utile.112
Thus, according to Article 16(2) of the AFMP, “account shall be taken of the
relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities prior
to the date of its signature”. And the Agreement on Air Transport goes even
further: as an exception, it gives a far-reaching reference to EC competition
law, according full effect to the effet utile principle.113 Article 1(2) AAT says
that “the provisions laid down in this Agreement as well as in the regulations
and directives specified in the Annex shall apply under the condition set out
106. Bernhardt, “Interpretation in International Law”, in Encyclopedia of Public Internation-
al Law, vol. II (Amsterdam et al., 1995), p. 1419 et seq.
107. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., [1964] ECR 1269 et seq.; Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos
v. Niederla¨ndische Finanzverwaltung, [1963] ECR 24 et seq.; Craig and de Bu´rca, supra note
48, p. 255 et seq.
108. E.g. Case 270/80, Polydor v. Harlequin, [1982] ECR 329, para 14 et seq.; confirmed
in Case C-257/99, Barkoci and Malik, [2001] ECR I-6557, para 51 et seq., Case C-235/99,
Kondova, [2001] ECR I-6427, para 51 et seq., Case C-63/99, Gloszczuk, [2001] ECR I-6369,
para 48 et seq., and Case C-162/00, Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer, [2002] ECR I-1049, para 32.
109. Cf. Borchardt, “Art. 220”, in Lenz, supra note 48, p. 1620 et seq., no. 18; Craig and de
Bu´rca, supra note 48, p. 217 et seq; Herdegen, supra note 48, no. 200 et seq.; Kapteyn and
VerLoren van Themaat, supra note 48, p. 85 et seq.; Streinz, supra note 48, no. 498; Wegener,
“Art. 220 EG-Vertrag”, in Calliess and Ruffert, supra note 48, p. 1989 et seq., no. 14.
110. Bernhardt, supra note 106, p. 1420. Cf. also Bernhardt, “The scope of territorial applica-
tion of treaties – Comments on Art. 25 of the ILC’s 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties”,
27 Zao¨RV (1967), 504.
111. Cf. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. (Manchester, 1984),
p. 118, with further references.
112. See infra 3.4.
113. See infra 5.2.
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hereafter. Insofar as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules
of the EC Treaty and to acts adopted in application of that Treaty, those
provisions shall, in their implementation and application, be interpreted in
conformity with the relevant rulings and decisions of the Court of Justice
and the Commission of the European Communities given prior to the date of
signature of this Agreement.”114
Through these constructions, the decisions rendered by the ECJ and the
CFI in utilization of the effet utile principle have to be considered in the
direct application and interpretation of the sectoral agreements before Swiss
courts.115 In this respect, the provisions of the agreements have a significant
European or integrational law character, despite its international law nature.
3.2. The institutional framework of the sectoral agreements
In accordance with the legal character of the seven sectoral agreements as
part of international law, each contracting party is responsible for the imple-
mentation and application of the treaties on its own territory. There is only
one important exception to that principle in the Agreement on Air Transport,
where the parties have stipulated that the European institutions apply and
supervise the regulations with regard to competition law which has an effect
on the European market.116
Unlike the EEA and other association treaties with several common
organs,117 the institutional framework of the sectoral agreements is limited
114. Cf. Cottier and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 106 et seq., make such a distinction between
general and substantive provisions as a logical consequence of the hybrid character of the sec-
toral agreements, being part both of public international law and of supranational Community
law.
115. Bergmann, supra note 78, p. 46; cf. in general Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, supra
note 48, p. 1330; on effet utile applying decisions with regard to the AFMP see Hailbronner,
“Freizu¨gigkeit nach EU-Recht und dem bilateralen Abkommen mit der Schweiz u¨ber die
Freizu¨gigkeit von Personen”, (2003) Zeitschrift fu¨r Europarecht, 51 and 53.
116. Jaag, “Institutionen und Verfahren”, in Thu¨rer et al., supra note 47, p. 42, 45, and Spinner,
“Rechtliche Grundlagen und Grenzen fu¨r bilaterale Abkommen”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra
note 47, p. 15, therefore call it a partial integration treaty. Kaddous, supra note 57, p. 79, 82,
and Cottier and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 89, qualify it even as a full integration treaty; see
also von Bu¨ren, “Auswirkungen des Luftverkehrsabkommens auf das Wettbewerbsrecht”, in
Cottier and Oesch, supra note 77, p. 71.
117. Cf. Arts. 98 et seq. of the EEA Agreement. Cf. e.g. Norberg, Ho¨kborg, Johansson,
Eliasson and Dedichen, EEA Law: A Commentary on the EEA Agreement (Stockholm, 1993),
p. 85 et seq., 112 et seq.; Haas, “Die institutionellen Bestimmungen des EWR-Abkommens
(Art. 89 – 110)”, in Za¨ch et al., supra note 23, p. 280 et seq.; Toledano Laredo, supra note 59,
1208 et seq.; Norberg, “The Agreement on a European Economic Area”, 29 CML Rev., 1180
et seq.
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and weak. For the management and supervision of the proper functioning118
of the sectoral agreements, the parties set up for every agreement one Joint
Committee,119 which is composed of representatives of the Contracting
Parties.120 According to the principle of equal rights of Contracting Parties
in international law,121 they decide by consensus, i.e. unanimously. The Joint
Committees adopt their own procedural rules and may appoint teams of
experts and observers to support them or to take over specific tasks.122 Such
organization rules are of administrative character and need no approval by a
Council decision in the EC or in Switzerland.123
In particular, the Joint Committees have the following purpose: they
exchange views and information of the Contracting Parties and may make
recommendations. In specific cases which are determined in the agreements,
they dispose of a decision-making power. Thus, the Joint Committees are
specifically authorized to change the annexes124 and to decide on the adop-
tion of new law of the Contracting Parties in the agreements. Depending
on the subject of such newly adopted law, this may be a matter of important
118. Cf. the criticism concerning the lack of a uniform definition of this term and
the tasks of the Joint Committees within the different sectoral agreements, by Theb-
rath, “Inkrafttreten der bilateralen Abkommen Schweiz-EU”, in Jusletter 30 Sept. 2002,
www.weblaw.ch/jusletter/Artikel. jsp? Article Nr=1916&Language=1, no. 157, 159 et seq.
119. The Agreement on Research is managed by the already existing Research Committee of
the general Agreement of 1986 (Art. 6 Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation
– ASTC). The Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products sets up a Veterinary Committee
(Art. 19 of Annex 11 of the Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products – ATAP) in addition to
a Joint Committee for general questions (Art. 6 Agreement on Trade in Agricultural Products).
The Joint Committee which is set up by the Agreement on Rail and Road Transport (ARR)
will take over the management of the Transit Agreement of 1992 as well (Art. 51 ARR). The
Joint Committee for the AFMP decided to create two subcommittees that will treat the fields
of social security and recognition of diploma: FJ 2003, 861. In the first meeting of the Joint
Committee of the AFMP, e.g., organizational regulations were established; see COM(2002)
476.
120. In the Swiss delegations, there are always representatives of the main responsible office,
the integration office and other offices interested in a specific area. The cantons are represented
in all areas. Cf. Jaag, supra note 116, p. 50 et seq.; Ro¨ttinger, supra note 57, no. 9, underlines
that in organs of association agreements, the Member States and the EC “are speaking with
one voice”.
121. See e.g. UN Charter Art. 2(1), deriving from the principle of equality of States; cf.
Mu¨ller and Wildhaber, supra note 67, p. 215 et seq., 807 et seq.; Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, 5th ed. (Oxford, 1998), p. 289 et seq.
122. Cf. e.g. the permanent traffic observatory for the monitoring of road, rail and combined
traffic in the Alpine region according to Art. 45 of the Agreement on Rail and Road Transport.
123. These additional bodies and committees are not international organizations and do not
have legal personality.
124. Cf. FJ 2003, 859. According to the joint declaration of the Contracting Parties in the
Final Acts, both the Agreement on Government Procurement and the Agreement on Mutual
Recognition in relation to Conformity Assessment provide for their annexes to be updated
within a month at most of the coming into force of the agreements.
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decisions and functions of the Joint Committees. For such a conferral of legis-
lative powers, the basis of democratic legitimation is quite weak, particularly
for Switzerland with its democratic institutions of direct participation of the
citizen. Nevertheless, the Contracting Parties remain competent for amend-
ments and changes of the sectoral agreements with new treaty obligations.
Such changes have to be approved by the Contracting Parties according to
their respective internal procedures.125
Whereas the EC is represented in the Joint Committees of the sectoral
agreements by the Commission alone, in the Joint Committee of the AFMP,
the Commission is assisted by representatives of the Member States. In this
case, “(t)he position to be taken by the Community in the course of the
implementation of the Agreement as regards decisions or recommendations
of the Joint Committee shall be laid down by the Council, acting by qualified
majority, on a proposal from the Commission”.126
3.3. Legal protection under the sectoral agreements
In general, the courts of the Contracting Parties are competent to interpret the
sectoral agreements and the texts they refer to.127 There is no joint judicial
body or tribunal supervising correct application and uniform interpretation of
the agreements.128 Therefore, it is possible that different courts of the Con-
tracting Parties, which are institutionally separate and independent, may take
divergent or even contradictory decisions within their own legal system.129
However, courts in the EU Member States can submit to the ECJ a question
125. Cf. Art. 300 EC and Arts. 140 et seq., 160 and 184 of the Swiss Constitution. Regarding
the competences and procedures for the decision-making of the Joint Committees, the Federal
Council should not vote inside the Committee without having the approval of the parliament
or the people if the nature of the provisions requires it, which is also the case when new EC
law is introduced or control mechanisms are delegated to EC institutions.
126. Council Decision 8767/99 of 12 July 1999, AELE 38/SOC 225.
127. Cf. Cottier and Evtimov, “Probleme des Rechtsschutzes bei der Anwendung der sekto-
riellen Abkommen mit der EG”, in Cottier and Oesch, supra note 77, p. 203 et seq.; Cottier
and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 82 et seq.
128. Cf. Borchardt, “Grundsa¨tze des Rechtsschutzes gema¨ss APF”, in Schaffhauser and
Schu¨rer, supra note 57, p. 51 et seq., considers neither the creation of a specific judicial body
nor a mixed jurisdiction like in the EEA as useful in case of the sectoral agreements. Cf.
also Thebrath, supra note 118, no. 162, who suggests de lege ferenda a judicial function for
the Joint Committees together with the ECJ, composed equally of Swiss and EC judges, as a
second instance.
129. Cf. Bergmann, supra note 78, p. 45, fearing negative consequences for the security and
clarity of law in the field of social security; Jaag, supra note 116, at 47, note 35, considers that
if Swiss tribunals in a specific decision ignore the case law of the ECJ, this is a violation of the
sectoral agreements in general. See also Spinner, supra note 116, p. 15.
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for a preliminary ruling according to Article 234 EC.130 Within the EU, uni-
formity in the application of the sectoral agreements is therefore guaranteed
by the ECJ.131
Recognizing the independence of their judiciary, the Contracting Parties
nevertheless may ask a Joint Committee set up by an agreement to determ-
ine the implications of the internal jurisprudence related to an agreement.
The only exception lies again in the Agreement on Air Transport. Here, the
provisions on competition shall be applied and controlled by the Community
institutions in accordance with Community legislation,132 and “(a)ll questions
concerning the validity of decisions of the institutions of the Community taken
on the basis of their competences under this Agreement, shall be of the exclus-
ive competence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities”.133
Contrary to the EEA Agreement, which secures the dynamic and homogen-
ous legal framework of the extended common market through a mandatory
obligation to adopt the enacted Community Law (acquis communautaire),134
the seven sectoral agreements hardly contain any provisions regarding
legal protection, but demand a reciprocal recognition of equivalent legal
provisions135 that have to be applied and interpreted according to internation-
al law principles.136
An important exception, besides the supranational approach in the Agree-
ment on Air Transport,137 is to be found in the AFMP. Article 11 of this
agreement contains a far-reaching minimal guarantee of legal proceedings.138
This means, first, an immediately enforceable right of appeal to the competent
authorities, which, as stated by its paragraph 1, is exclusively destined to “the
application of the provisions of this Agreement”. Second, such appeals must
130. Cf. Borchardt, supra note 128, p. 59 et seq.; Bucher, supra note 68, p. 92 et seq.;
Koutrakos, supra note 54, p. 36, 52, would like a clearer reasoning by the ECJ in this area with
regard to mixed agreements. See for the EEA: Norberg, supra note 117, p. 1189.
131. Swiss nationals claiming social security benefits from an EU Member State can use this
remedy. Cf. Kahil-Wolff, supra note 82, p. 65; Koutrakos, supra note 54, p. 34, points out that
Art. 310 EC brings the entire agreement within the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction; see the
Demirel case, supra note 64.
132. Art. 11 referring to Arts. 8 and 9 AAT.
133. Art. 20 AAT. Cf. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1329; Cottier
and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 89; Hirsbrunner, “Die kartellrechtlichen Bestimmungen des
Abkommens u¨ber den Luftverkehr”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 463 et seq., 476;
Jaag, supra note 116, pp. 42, 45 and 48.
134. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1315 et seq.; Haas, supra note 117,
p. 274 et seq., 295 et seq.; Norberg et al., supra note 117, p. 104 et seq., 177 et seq.
135. See the message of the Federal Council to Parliament of 23 June 1999 on the approval
of the sectoral agreements between Switzerland and the EC: FJ 1999, 6128 et seq.
136. See supra 2.1.3. and 5.
137. See supra 2.2. and 2.3. Cf. also Jaag, supra note 116, p. 42, 58 et seq.
138. Cf. Breitenmoser and Isler, supra note 48, p. 1003 et seq., 1014 et seq.; Borchardt, supra
note 128, p. 54 et seq.; Kahil-Wolff, supra note 68, p. 68 et seq.
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be processed within a reasonable period of time.139 And third, this guarantee
gives the right “to appeal to the competent national judicial body in respect of
decisions on appeals, or the absence of a decision within a reasonable period
of time”.140
Since Article 11 AFMP applies to all persons, there may be some problems
with regard to the definition and interpretation of the general exclusion of
public servants from certain rights as stated by Article 10 Annex I AFMP. The
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Pellegrin v. France,141
which refers to the corresponding interpretation by the ECJ concerning Article
39(4) EC,142 tries to make a clarifying distinction: the term “public service
employment” used for the exclusion from the right to a fair trial under Article
6 ECHR, is now – by taking as a basis a functional point of view and following
Article 39(4) EC and its interpretation by the ECJ – very narrowly limited to
the exercise of core sovereign powers.143
According to Article 11 AFMP, the Contracting Parties are obliged to
provide for two-tier appeal proceedings. Paragraph 1 guarantees the right
of appeal to a competent national authority144 and paragraph 2 says that
the appeal has to be processed within a reasonable period of time.145 The
provision is similar to Article 13 ECHR. An effective appeal to a sufficiently
independent administrative body has to be provided for.146 The possibility
of raising objections before the instance that already decided on the case
in question is not sufficient.147 According to Article 11(3) AFMP, persons
must have the opportunity to appeal to the competent national judicial body
in respect of decisions on appeals or the absence of a decision within a
reasonable period of time. This provision brings to mind Article 6(1) ECHR,
which is also applicable under the AFMP in the area of, among others, social
security, because the enforcement of social security claims normally concerns
139. Art. 11(2) AFMP.
140. Art. 11(3) AFMP. Cf. Bucher, supra note 68, no. 49 et seq., no. 70 et seq., who considers
the Swiss system of legal protection to be in conformity with Art. 11 AFMP.
141. Judgment No. 2854/ 95 of 9 Dec. 1999, Reports 1999-VIII, 207/251.
142. Ibid., paras. 37 et seq.
143. Ibid., paras. 66 et seq. See also Maritz, “Der Dienstleistungsverkehr im Abkommen u¨ber
die Freizu¨gigkeit der Personen”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 345.; Brechmann,
“Art. 39 EG-Vertrag”, in Calliess and Ruffert, supra note 48, no. 99 et seq., 103 et seq.; Scheuer,
“Art. 39”, in Lenz, supra note 48, no. 83.
144. A judicial body is not required. Cf. also Kahil-Wolff, supra note 82, p. 62 et seq.
145. Kahil-Wolff, supra note 82, p. 63, is not convinced that cantonal Swiss courts always
meet this condition in the field of social security.
146. Cf. Ha¨fliger and Schu¨rmann, Die Europa¨ische Menschenrechtskonvention und die
Schweiz, 2nd ed. (Bern, 1999), p. 333 et seq.; Villiger, Handbuch der Europa¨ischen Menschen-
rechtskonvention (EMRK), 2nd ed. (Zu¨rich, 1999), no. 649.
147. Schweizer, “Kommentierung von Art.13 EMRK”, in Internationaler Kommentar zur
Europa¨ischen Menschenrechtskonvention, 5th instalment (Cologne et al., 2002), para 65.
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civil rights in the sense of Article 6(1) ECHR.148 Taking Article 6(1) ECHR
as a yardstick, in contrast to Article 11(1) AFMP and Article 13 ECHR, an
appeal to an administrative body in the second instance is not sufficient, but
an independent and impartial court has to decide.149 This requirement is met
in Switzerland by the Federal Tribunal, the Federal Social Security Tribunal
and the Federal Appeal Commissions, but not by the Federal Council.150 In
the light of the object and purpose of a uniform application and interpretation
of the AFMP in Switzerland, cantonal courts are not national instances in the
sense of Article 11(3) AFMP.
Article 11 AFMP is, like Article 6(1) ECHR, directly applicable and, there-
fore, gives an individual right to legal protection in its scope of application,
even if the municipal procedural law does not provide for a legal remedy.151
With respect to legal protection of private persons, two main competences of
the Joint Committee need to be stressed: on the one hand, the responsibility for
the proper application of the agreement according to Article 14(1) AFMP;152
on the other hand, the right to determine the implications of new case law
of the ECJ according to Article 16(2) AFMP.153 It is questionable whether
national courts can suspend proceedings when encountering difficulties of
interpretation in order to turn to the Federal Council, so that it can consult
the Joint Committee. Such an action is not excluded by the agreement, but
is hardly compatible with the courts’ view of independence.154 They will
normally want to decide without any delay caused by a consultation of the
Joint Committee, which could moreover violate the imperative of processing
appeals within a reasonable period of time stated in Article 11(2) AFMP.
148. Cf. the description of the precedents by the European Court of Human Rights, in
Haefliger and Schu¨rmann, supra note 146, p. 144 et seq., Villiger, supra note 146, no. 382 et
seq., 389, and Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1607. See also Bucher,
supra note 68, no. 55 et seq., with regard to the cantonal procedures of appeal.
149. Regarding the requirements of Art. 6 ECHR on a court, cf. Haefliger and Schu¨rmann,
supra note 146, p. 166 et seq.; Villiger, supra note 146, no. 415.
150. Kiener, Richterliche Unabha¨ngigkeit, Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an Richte-
rinnen und Richter (Bern, 2001), p. 316 et seq. (with further references).
151. See FT 125 II 425 et seq.
152. With respect to the management of the AFMP, the Joint Committee can, just as in the
other sectoral agreements, issue recommendations and decide on changes of Annexes II and
III to the Agreement (Art. 18 AFMP).
153. Cf. supra note 125. Disputes among the Contracting Parties on application and inter-
pretation of the AFMP are also settled by the Joint Committee (Art. 19 AFMP). See on the
parallel regulation in the EEA Agreement: Norberg, supra note 117, p. 1193.
154. Cf. Jaag, supra note 116, p. 54 et seq.
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3.4. Changes and updating of the sectoral agreements
One of the main reasons for the rejection of the EEA Agreement by the
Swiss people was its dynamic character, i.e. the obligation also to adopt
the future acquis communautaire in the dynamic and homogenous EEA,
irrespective of the time of signing the EEA Agreement.155 Article 6 EEA
Agreement, declaring the decisions of the ECJ held prior to signing of the
Agreement on 4 May 1992 to be binding,156 requires provisions of the EEA
Agreement to be identical with the corresponding primary and secondary
provisions of EC law in their basic content.157 The advance to the future
acquis communautaire, which has to be mandatorily implemented by all
EFTA countries according to Article 97 et seq. EEA Agreement, will only be
determined by the EC institutions and solely in the context of EC legislation
(so-called decision-making procedure). EFTA Member States merely have the
possibility to influence this development through issuing opinions (so-called
decision-shaping procedure).158 The subsequent procedure for adopting new
EEA legislation under Articles 98–104 EEA Agreement puts a time limit on
national proceedings of approval.159
Unlike in the EEA Agreement, the sectoral agreements are static and have
no dynamic character.160 That means that only the acquis communautaire
prior to the date of signature of the sectoral agreements and to which reference
is made will be applied in relations between the Contracting Parties. Case law
of the ECJ and the CFI established after 21 June 1999 must be brought to
Switzerland’s attention. It is then up to the Joint Committees, which should
ensure the proper functioning of the agreements, to determine the implications
of such case law.161 New legal acts of the Contracting Parties have to be
announced to the other Party through the Joint Committee, which “shall hold
155. See supra 3.3. Cf. also Veuve, “Mesures d’accompagnement de l’Accord sur la libre
circulation des personnes”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 291. On the EEA:
Norberg, supra note 117, p. 1172. He stresses that a particular challenge was to safeguard the
decision-making autonomy of each of the Contracting Parties while securing the dynamic and
homogeneous concept that requires a parallel development with the EC rules (p. 1175).
156. Cf. Jacot-Guillarmod, “Pre´ambule, objectifs et principes (art. 1er -7 EEE)”, in Jacot-
Guillarmod, supra note 23, p. 63 et seq.; Petersmann, “EWR-Abkommen, GATT und die
Wirtschaftsfreiheit in der Schweiz”, in Jacot-Guillarmod, supra note 23, p. 90 et seq.
157. See Norberg et al., supra note 117, p. 104 et seq.
158. Cf. Felder, “Structure institutionnelle et proce´dure de´cisionnelle de l’EEE”, in Jacot-
Guillarmod, supra note 23, p. 575 et seq.; Felder, supra note 55, p. 122 et seq.; Haas, supra
note 117, p. 287 et seq.; Norberg, supra note 117, p. 1183 et seq.; Norberg et al., supra note
117, p. 129 et seq., 137 et seq.
159. See FJ 1992 IV 1 et seq.
160. FJ 2002, 6328; Felder, supra note 55, p. 128; Jaag, supra note 116, p. 59 et seq.; Spinner,
supra note 116, p. 15.
161. Art. 16(1) and 2 AFMP, see also Art. 9 ASTC, Art. 7 AGP, Art. 12 and 18(2) MRA, Art.
8 and 11 ATAP, Art. 23 and 30 AAT, Art. 52 and 55 ARR. Cf. supra note 125. Cf. Borchardt,
1160 Breitenmoser CML Rev. 2003
an exchange of views on the implications of such an amendment for the
proper functioning of the Agreement”.162 Since the references in the sectoral
agreements to Community Law are static,163 a change in an EC provision does
not automatically bring about a change in the agreements. Amendments to the
agreements will only enter into force after the respective internal procedures
have been completed.164 Merely technical adjustments and amendments to
the acquis communautaire may, nevertheless, be adopted by decision of the
Joint Committee and may enter into force immediately after that.165
An exception is once again the Agreement on Air Transport.166 Referring
in a general and dynamic way to EC law, Article 11 AAT states that compet-
ition law in the field of air transport shall be applied and controlled by the
Community institutions in accordance with Community legislation.
3.5. “Guillotine Clauses”
As a consequence of the principle of “appropriate parallelism” introduced by
the EC, the seven sectoral agreements are mandatorily coupled with each oth-
er by so-called “guillotine clauses”.167 This means that all seven agreements
could only come into force together168 and will also come to an end if any
one of them is terminated or not renewed.169 Thus, according to these guil-
lotine clauses the seven agreements cease to apply six months after receipt of
notification of non-renewal or termination.170 Cancellation of one agreement
will, therefore, have direct consequences for the effectiveness of the other
sectoral agreements.
supra note 128, p. 63 et seq., and Bergmann, supra note 78, p. 45, both criticize the risks of
conflicts with these provisions.
162. Art. 17(2) AFMP.
163. E.g. Annexes II and III AFMP.
164. In Switzerland there may be the possibility of a referendum.
165. See supra note 161. Cf. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1381.
166. Cf. also Cottier and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 89; Felder, supra note 55, p. 128 et seq.
167. FJ 1999, 6156; cf. Fasel, supra note 1, p.14 et seq.; Spinner, supra note 116, p. 17,
interprets the guillotine clauses as a demonstration of power by the EU. Cf. also Fraoua and
Mader, “Les accords sectoriels et la de´mocratie suisse”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47,
p. 157, who stress that because of the connecting guillotine clauses, a negative vote regarding
the sectoral agreements becomes more difficult for the Swiss citizen.
168. The EC or the ECAE and the EC respectively (Agreement on Scientific and Techno-
logical Cooperation) as well as the EC and the EU Member States (Agreement on the Free
Movement of Persons) would not have put into force the other agreements if one agreement
had been rejected by Switzerland in the facultative referendum of 21 May 2000 (supra, section
1).
169. Cf. Thu¨rer and Hillemanns, supra note 50, p. 29.
170. Cf. Art. 25(4) AFMP; Art. 25(4) AGP; Art. 21(4) MRA; Art. 36(4) AAT; Art. 58 para.
4 ARR; Art. 14(4) ASTC; Art. 17(4) ATAP.
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4. The Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons (AFMP)
4.1. Aims and contents
Once the transitional periods have expired,171 the AFMP will ultimately be
effective with regard to the entire acquis communautaire in the field of free
movement and settlement of persons. The text of the Agreement does not
explicitly state this, but the preamble makes clear that the Contracting Parties
are determined “to bring about the free movement of persons between them
on the basis of the rules applying in the European Community”. Still, its
content is limited to the acquis communautaire as it was developed up to 21
June 1999.172
Articles 39 and 43 EC also belong to these “rules”. From those provisions,
the ECJ deduces not only an extensive prohibition of discrimination, but
also – going further than this – a prohibition of restraints:173 regulations that
hinder or deter a national of a Member State from leaving his or her country
of origin in order to make use of his or her right of free movement, constitute
impairments to this freedom, even if they are applied independently of the
nationality of the persons concerned.174 All corollary rights, such as the right
to seek employment in a Contracting State,175 are likewise part of the relevant
acquis communautaire.176
After the transitional period, persons coming from another Contracting
State and working in Switzerland for more than one year will have a right
to stay for five years.177 Below one year of employment, a residence permit
for the same duration as the contract is guaranteed.178 A person employed
for less than three months does not need a residence permit.179 The same
171. See infra, 4.4.
172. COM(1999) 229 final, 2; FJ 1999, 6310. Cf. Breitenmoser and Isler, supra note 48, p.
1011 et seq. But the Joint Committee may decide on the consideration of new EC jurisdiction,
Art. 16(2) AFMP; see also supra 5.2., 3., and 4. as well as below in this section.
173. See cf. Scheuer, supra note 143, no. 83; id., “Art. 43”, in Lenz, supra note 48, no. 7 et
seq.
174. See p. 4921 et seq. of the judgment in Bosman, supra note 96; see also Breitenmoser
and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 934, 1087, 1358; Fasel, supra note 1, p. 17; Brechmann,
supra note 143, no. 45 et seq., 48 et seq.
175. Art. 2(1)(2) Annex I AFMP; Article 39(3) lit. b EC; Brechmann, supra note 143, no.
85.
176. The Community has recently decided that Swiss nationals no longer need a visa to enter
the EU territory for a stay of more than 3 months. Council Regulation (EC) No. 453/2003 of
6 March 2003, amending Reg. (EC) No. 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals
are exempt from that requirement, O.J. 2003, L. 69/10.
177. Art. 6(1) Annex I AFMP.
178. Art. 6(2)(1) of Annex I AFMP.
179. Art. 6(2)(2) of Annex I AFMP.
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unconditional rights are enjoyed by their spouses, their children under 21
years and other dependant members of the family,180 which is a remarkable
difference to spouses of Swiss nationals who come from other countries
outside the EU, as these have a conditional right to stay for just one year.
Children who are not EU or EFTA citizens may join their Swiss parent(s)
only if they are under 18 years old.181 In a recent judgment the Federal
Tribunal upheld this discrimination of Swiss nationals compared to citizens
of the EU or the EFTA countries regarding the bringing-in of family members
with a foreign nationality.182
The AFMP does not guarantee rights founded on the status of citizen of
the Union according to Article 18(1) EC.183 Therefore, the famous and far-
reaching judgments of the ECJ in the cases of Marı´a Martı´nez Sala184 and
Baumbast185 do not come under the agreement, which does not contain a
provision similar to the discrimination clause of Article 12 EC, as far as its
field of application.186 In contrast, the principle of equal treatment provided
for in Article 2 AFMP is not as extensive; it only applies in the areas of the
agreement according to its Annexes I, II and III. Rights based on the status
of citizen of the Union are not covered by these Annexes.
Comparable considerations can be made with respect to the judgment of the
ECJ in the Decker case.187 There, a Luxembourg national claimed reimburse-
180. Art. 3 Annex I AFMP.
181. Arts. 7 and 17(2) of the Swiss Statute on the Settlement of Foreigners (SC 142.20). This
right will be automatically renewed every year, after 5 years indefinitely. Cf. the parliamentary
motion 01.3237 by Vreni Hubmann, official bulletin of the National Council 2002, p. 385, and
the proposed Arts. 41–50 for a new statute for foreigners, FJ 2002, 3851.
182. The judgment left the correction of this situation to legislation, making reference to
Art. 191 of the Swiss Constitution (see supra 3.1.3), which declares Swiss federal laws and
international law binding for the Federal Tribunal. FT 129 II 249.
183. Cf. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. I, no. 429 et seq.
184. Case C-85/96, Marı´a Martı´nez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691. In that case,
in proceedings before the Higher Social Court of Bavaria, the German Bundesland “Freistaat
Bayern” refused to pay a child-raising allowance to the applicant, who was a Spanish national,
on the grounds that she was neither an employed person nor in possession of a valid residence
permit. The ECJ decided differently. In paras. 61 et seq., it deemed that Mrs Martı´nez Sala as
a result of her status as citizen of the Union, must not be discriminated against in comparison
with German nationals. Cf. the critical annotation by Tomuschat, 37 CML Rev., 449 et seq.,
456; Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1090.
185. Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R., ECR 2002, I-7091.
186. Cf. Spiegel, “Uebernahme der Rechtsprechung des Europa¨ischen Gerichtshofs?”, in
Murer (Ed.), Das Personenverkehrsabkommen mit der EU und seine Auswirkungen auf die
soziale Sicherheit in der Schweiz (Bern, 2001), p. 331, 351 et seq.; Hailbronner, supra note
115, p. 53 et seq., however, concerning the free movement of students, does not completely
exclude application if citizenship of the Union is only one interpretation element among other
relevant factors, p. 55.
187. Case C-120/95, Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des employe´s prive´s, [1998] ECR
I-1831 et seq.; see also Bergmann, supra note 78, p. 37 et seq.
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ment from his health insurance company for spectacles bought in Belgium.
According to Luxembourg law, an authorization would have been necessary
for this, which is why the health insurance company did not want to reimburse
him. The ECJ decided that this regulation violated the right of free movement
of goods under Article 28 EC.188 However, since the free movement of goods
is not established in the sectoral agreements, a similar Swiss regulation would
not face objections.189 On the other hand, a constellation such as the one in
Kohll190 would have to be treated the same way as in the EU.191 The passive
freedom to provide person-oriented services, which includes dental treatment
in another Member State, is guaranteed for a duration of 90 days of actual
work in a calendar year or three months according to Article 5(1) AFMP in
combination with Article 23(1) of its Annex I.192 In Kohll, a person who was
insured in Luxembourg had applied for a dental treatment for his daughter in
Trier (Germany). His request was refused, but the ECJ held this denial to be a
violation of the freedom of services within the meaning of Article 49 EC.193
It is important to emphasize that Council Regulation 64/221/EC is part of the
Agreement, and can be the legal basis for a refusal of the right to enter and to
reside for reasons of public order, public security and public health.194 When
applying this exception, the State must first ascertain whether a less intensive
measure would be sufficient; also, the conduct which the Contracting State
concerned wishes to prevent has to give rise, in the case of its own nationals,
to punitive measures or other genuine and effective measures designed to
combat it.195
188. Decker, supra note 187, para 46.
189. Bergmann, supra note 78, p. 47 et seq. Same opinion held by Kahil-Wolff, supra note
82, p. 60 et seq.
190. Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie, ECR 1998, I-1931 et
seq. See also Bergmann, supra note 78, p. 37 et seq.
191. Cf. Bergmann, supra note 78, p. 48. For another view, see Kahil-Wolff, supra note 82,
p. 61. However, she is convinced that recent Swiss legislation, e.g. the new Art. 4a of the
Law on Health Insurance (SC 832.10), providing for the same obligatory insurance for family
members of a person working in Switzerland, and Art. 13 and 14 of the Law on Unemployment
Insurance (SC 837.0), stating a residence clause, is discriminatory.
192. Cf. Martz, “Der Dienstleistungsverkehr im Abkommen u¨ber die Freizu¨gigkeit der Per-
sonen, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 331, 338.
193. Ibid., para 54; see also Case C-157/99, B.S.M. Smits-Geraets v. Stichting Ziekenfonds
VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, [2001] ECR I-5473;
Case C-368/98, Abdon Vanbraekel v. Alliance nationale des mutualite´s chre´tiennes (ANMC),
[2001] ECR I-5363.
194. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 64/221 of 25 Feb. 1964, completed by Council Regula-
tions (EEC) No. 72/194 and No. 75/35. Art. 5(2) Annex I of the AFMP, referring to Art. 16
AFMP.
195. See recently in Case C-100/01, Ministre de l’Inte´rieur v. Aitor Oteiza Olazabal [2002]
ECR I-10981.
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4.2. The relevant acquis communautaire
With regard to the acquis communautaire which has to be taken into account
by Swiss authorities and courts, Article 16(2) AFMP states the following:
until the date of signing of the Agreement, i.e. 21 June 1999, the case law of
the ECJ interpreting concepts and terms of Community Law constitutes part of
the relevant acquis communautaire. The significance and implications of the
case law after that date will be determined by the Joint Committee.196 For this
purpose the jurisprudence “shall be brought to Switzerland’s attention”.197
This provision is not unproblematic. On the one hand, the question arises what
is the relationship between the Swiss courts and the Joint Committee198 and
via what procedure they receive the information from the Joint Committee.
On the other hand, it is difficult to appraise in what cases and under what
circumstances and conditions new judgments depart from or extend the former
acquis communautaire.199
The ECJ rarely declares a change in its case law as being a new leading
case,200 departing from precedents, as some other courts do. To that extent,
the decisions of the ECJ on limitation of the scope of application of Article 28
EC are an exception,201 as is the change of practice with respect to the limited
right of action of the European Parliament.202 The issue can be illustrated
for the area of free movement of persons with the example of the case law
following the Bosman case,203 which dealt with the transfer rules for profes-
sional sportsmen and their compatibility with Article 39 EC. In Lehtonen204
196. About the far-reaching consequences see supra note 125. Cf. also Bergmann, supra
note 78, p. 45, criticizing Art. 16(2) AFMP and underlining the problems which would arise if
the Joint Committee does not perform its duties strictly. Hailbronner, supra note 115, p. 51 et
seq., emphasizes that even judgments after 21 June 1999 must be taken into consideration for
interpretation of the AFMP, if they merely specify and concretize case law prior to that date.
See also below.
197. See also supra 3.4.
198. Kahil-Wolff, supra note 82, p. 68, is worried about the lack of possibility of appeal
after a Joint Committee decision differing from that of the Federal Court or the Federal Court
of Social Security. In case of a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights that is in
contrast to a Swiss decision of last instance, this decision may be revised according to Art.
139a of the Swiss Statute on the Administration of Justice (SC 173.110). See also supra, 3.3.
199. Critical also Lustenberger, “Das Verfahren in zwischenstaatlichen Fa¨llen gema¨ss
Abkommen”, in Murer, supra note 186, p. 78.
200. See also Hailbronner, supra note 115, p. 52; Kahil-Wolff, supra note 82, p. 67. The
Swiss courts do in general declare a change explicitly, e.g. FT 125 V 205.
201. Case C-267 & 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard, [1993] ECR
I-6097, para 16.
202. Case C-70/88, European Parliament v. Council (Tschernobyl I), [1990] ECR I-2041,
paras. 15 et seq., compared to Case 294/83, Parti e´cologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parlia-
ment, [1986] ECR 1339, paras. 23 et seq.
203. See supra note 96.
204. Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, [2000] ECR I-2681.
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and Delie`ge205 the Court specified and put in relative terms its more gener-
al statement in the Bosman judgment. Because of this delimited and more
precise scope of application of Community law, these two new cases may be
seen as part of the former acquis communautaire. The cases Lehtonen and
Delie`ge, therefore, are not further developments, for whose incorporation into
the acquis communautaire of the AFMP a specific and unanimous decision
by the Joint Committee would be required. This is otherwise with regard to
the most recent case law of the ECJ in tax matters, which is now also part of
the new acquis communautaire in the area of free movement of persons,206
but will be applicable under the AFMP only after a unanimous decision of
the Joint Committee.
4.3. Legal nature
As already mentioned, the AFMP was concluded as a mixed agreement.207
This category, which is now explicitly provided for in the EC Treaty,208 was
developed in practice by the ECJ.209 But there still remain some unclear and
controversial points concerning the concept of mixity because there is neither
a precise written guideline for its handling210 nor anything other than an
undetailed rule about its impact on the division of competences.211 Rules on
205. Case C-51/96 & C-191/97, Delie`ge v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines ASBL
and others, [2000] I-2549.
206. Cf. Case C-385/00, F.W.L. de Groot v. Staatssecretaris van Financie¨n, [2002] ECR
I-11819. See infra text at note 241.
207. See supra 3.1.1.: “Shared powers” and “joint competences” are concerned.
208. It appears for the first time in the new version of Art. 133(6) EC, revised by the Treaty
of Nice. The provision concerns cultural, audio-visual, educational, social and health related
services in trade agreements.
209. Cf. Opinion 1/1994, WTO, supra note 53; see also Gaja, “Trends in judicial activism
and judicial self-restraint relating to Community agreements”, in Cannizzaro, supra note 48,
p. 124; the term results from “a picture of a concept of overlapping and shared external
competence”, Klabbers, “Restraints on the treaty-making powers of Member States deriving
from EU-Law: towards a framework for analysis”, in Cannizzaro, ibid., p. 154, 167. Cf. also
the duty of cooperation in Opinion 2/1991, ILO, [1993] ECR I-1061, para 4.
210. Cf. Neuwahl, “Shared powers or combined incompetence? More on mixity”, in 33 CML
Rev., 683, 687. She doubts that the ECJ will ever be willing or able to lay down a detailed rule
and therefore suggests the drafting of a code of conduct.
211. Mixity does not in general give a more precise picture of the division of competence,
but it can avoid difficult political choices because the division of power is no longer relevant
in itself: Klabbers, supra note 209, p. 157. He also evokes the question whether the exercise of
political power still depends of the possession of a legal power (p. 158). For Tomuschat, supra
note 48, p. 184, there is “an institutional necessity to conclude mixed agreements” with third
countries. Cf. in general Pocar, “The decision-making process of the European Community in
external relations”, in Cannizzaro, supra note 48, p. 16; Baratta, “Overlaps between European
Community competence and European Union foreign policy activity”, in Cannizzaro ibid., p.
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the international responsibility of the EC and its Member States in case of the
violation of such a treaty have not yet been confirmed by the ECJ.212
Mixity can be an important instrument for the Member States to maintain
their influence in the negotiation, conclusion, application and implementa-
tion of an agreement.213 However, when an agreement is mixed, the acquis
communautaire automatically becomes inseparably connected to all fields of
that agreement and has therefore to be respected directly or indirectly also
in areas which may be within the exclusive competence of the EU Member
States.214 Within this larger scope, the ECJ may try to extend its control in
order to reach uniformity and conformity.215
4.4. Transitional periods
The AFMP does not immediately extend the entire acquis communautaire of
Articles 39 et seq. EC, but only after different transitional periods.216
64, observes a lack of clear power divisions and corresponding regulations in the whole field
of external relations, which might weaken the rule of law. Same opinion: Gaja, supra note 209,
p. 131, who criticizes the ECJ for giving too much freedom to the Community institutions
(self-restraint); see also Tizzano, supra note 48, p. 136 et seq.
212. Neframi, supra note 50, p. 205, gives a model of categorization for international respons-
ibility in case of mixed agreements.
213. See Opinion 2/2000, Cartagena Protocol, [2001] ECR I-9713, where the Commission
argued in favour of a preponderant EC competence based on a wide interpretation of Art.
133 EC, leaving to the Member States no more than a residual power. The Member States
refused this extension, trying to safeguard their partial power. This might reflect the basic
tension between a fast integrative federalism and an intergovernmental confederalism model,
for which mixity is indeed a pragmatic solution in the field of external relations. The ECJ
decided that the competence concerning the Cartagena Protocol is shared. Cf. also Klabbers,
supra note 209, p. 157; Neuwahl, supra note 210, p. 679.
214. Case C-53/96, Herme`s International v. FHT Marketing Choice, [1998] ECR I-3603 at
3648, para 32: “where a provision can apply both to situations falling within the scope of
national law and to situations falling within the scope of Community law, it is clearly in the
Community interest that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, that provision
should be interpreted uniformly, whatever the circumstances in which it is to apply.” See also
Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98, Parfums Christian Dior and others, [2000] ECR I-11344 at
11358, para 35; cf. Gaja, supra note 209, p. 119 et seq.; Tizzano, supra note 48, p. 140, saying
that “no sector is now beyond the reach of Community law”; Klabbers, supra note 209, p. 161,
164; Neuwahl, supra note 210, p. 678.
215. The close relation between two fields of competence can even lead to an implied power
of the Community and restrict the Member States’ competence to conclude agreements in that
area at all. Case C-22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), [1971] ECR 263 at 274, para 17.
See also Gaja, supra note 209, p. 121; Klabbers, supra note 209, p. 167; Tizzano, supra note
48, p. 138 et seq.
216. See also Grossen and de Pale´zieux, supra note 77, p. 113 et seq.; Gasser, supra note 51,
p. 275; Mach, “L’accord sur la libre circulation des personnes dans l’optique des praticiens”,
in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 313 et seq.
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On entry into force of the Agreement, the following rights are guaranteed:
– workers from the EC who are already integrated into the regular Swiss
labour market must be treated equally to nationals;217
– there are long-term (five years) and short-term (up to one year) per-
missions to reside;218 renewal of the long-term residence permit will take
place automatically,219 renewal of the short-term residence permit only if the
employed person furnishes proof to the competent authorities that he or she is
able to pursue an economic activity.220 The status of so-called “saisonnier”,
i.e. seasonally employed person, is abolished as well as the obligation on this
category and on short-time residents to leave Switzerland immediately after
the end of the contract for work;221
– occupational and geographical mobility for workers integrated into the
regular Swiss labour market is guaranteed; they will have a right to change
residence and employment without previous official authorization;222
– a person who has the right of residence and is a national of a Contracting
Party is entitled to be joined by the members of his or her family;223
– frontier workers only need to return once a week to their place of residence224
and they enjoy geographic and occupational mobility inside the frontier
zones;225
– the number of new residence permits may not be limited to fewer than
15,000 (long-term residence) respectively 115,000 (short-term residence) per
year.226
After two years, these rights are extended, since the priority of local workers
and all disadvantages for EU nationals regarding the controls of wage and
working conditions are abolished.227
After five years, the following rights are guaranteed:
– the quantitative limits for residence will be cancelled;228
– the frontier zones for frontier workers will be abolished;229
217. Art. 10(5) AFMP.
218. Art. 6(1) and 6(2)(1) Annex I AFMP.
219. Art. 6(1) Annex I AFMP.
220. Art. 27(1) Annex I AFMP.
221. Art. 27(1) and (3) Annex I AFMP.
222. Art. 10(5) AFMP.
223. Art. 3 Annex I AFMP. See with regard to the discrimination of Swiss nationals through
the interaction of this provision with the Swiss Statute on the Settlement of Foreigners (SC
142.20) supra 4.1.
224. Art. 28 and Art. 32 Annex I AFMP. Since the entry into force of the AFMP, a large
number of former frontier workers now reside in Switzerland, FJ 2003, 861.
225. Art. 30(2) and Art. 34 Annex I AFMP.
226. Art. 10(3) AFMP.
227. Art. 10(2) AFMP.
228. Art. 10(1)(2) AFMP.
229. Art. 7(3) Annex I AFMP.
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– if the number of new residence permits in a given year exceeds the average
of the three preceding years by more than 10%, Switzerland may again,
for the following two years, unilaterally limit the number of new residents.
This regulation is valid up to twelve years after the entry into force of the
Agreement.230
After seven years, the treaty ends – together with the other six sectoral
agreements – if Switzerland231 or the EU decide not to continue with it. If
neither Contracting Party cancels it, it will be renewed indefinitely.232
After twelve years – for Swiss nationals inside the EU already after two
years233 – transition to the free movement of persons according to EC law
will be completed; a safeguard clause may be applied by mutual consent.234
4.5. Relation to existing agreements
The scope of application of the AFMP is the same as existing bilateral treaty
obligations of Switzerland, also and particularly in the area of social security.
For this reason, the question of the relationship between this sectoral Agree-
ment and other bilateral treaties that Switzerland has already concluded with
the Member States of the EU is to be considered.235
According to Article 20 AFMP, bilateral social security agreements
between Switzerland and the EU Member States covering the same subject-
matter shall be suspended, unless otherwise provided for under Annex II.
For employed persons who had moved their permanent residency to or com-
menced employment in a different EU Member State before the entry into
force of the sectoral Agreement, earlier existing treaties on social security are
still applicable, corresponding to the precedents of the ECJ, if they comprise
a more favourable regulation.236 These precedents are determined strongly
by considerations of effet utile,237 but they should also have validity under
230. Art. 10(4)(1) AFMP.
231. The Federal Council and the Swiss Parliament will decide by taking experiences into
account. A facultative referendum is possible.
232. Art. 25(2) AFMP.
233. Because the rights provided for in Art. 10(1), (3) and (4) AFMP are reserved for
Switzerland only.
234. The number of new residents cannot be limited anymore; see Art. 10(4)(1) AFMP; this
was the last remaining restriction (supra note 230). The mutual safeguard clause is based on
Arts. 14 and 19 AFMP. Cf. FJ 1999, 6153, 6313, 6316.
235. See also Thu¨rer and Hillemanns, supra note 50, p. 26 et seq.
236. Case C-227/89, Ludwig Ro¨nfeldt v. Bundesversicherungsanstalt fu¨r Angestellte, [1991]
ECR I-323 et seq.; Case C-75/99, Edmund Thelen, [2000] ECR I-9399.
237. See e.g. the argumentation of the ECJ in Ro¨nfeldt, supra note 236, para 23 et seq.
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the AFMP in the light of the protection of asset rights, which is part of the
right of property.238
Furthermore, according to Article 21 AFMP, the bilateral treaties between
Switzerland and the EU Member States on double taxation are not affected
and remain in full force. Thus, the definition of “frontier workers” in the
double taxation agreement is unaffected (para 1), and the Contracting Parties
are not prevented from distinguishing in their fiscal legislation between tax-
payers whose situations are not comparable, especially as regards their place
of residence (para 2). Nor will the Contracting Parties be prevented from
adopting or applying measures to ensure the imposition, payment and effect-
ive recovery of taxes or to forestall tax evasion under their own tax legislation
or agreements aimed at preventing double taxation (para 3). The latter provi-
sion does not however oblige the Contracting Parties to cooperate and to give
mutual assistance and information in tax cases.239 Nevertheless, in the recent
decision in de Groot, the ECJ states that fundamental freedoms must always
be respected when dealing with taxation law in general and conventions for
the avoidance of double taxation specifically,240 even though direct taxation
falls within the competence of the Member States.241 This is the first case
that may go further than the acquis communautaire referred to in the sectoral
Agreement. Therefore, the Joint Committee has to decide whether and how
it will be introduced into the AFMP.
Bilateral agreements concluded in other areas are not affected insofar as
they are compatible with the AFMP.242 If they are incompatible with this
Agreement, the latter shall prevail.243
238. See Art. 1(1) of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.
Cf. Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, vol. II, no. 1661; Brombacher Steiner, who does
not consider the right of property as relevant, takes a different view: “Die soziale Sicherheit
im Abkommen u¨ber die Freizu¨gigkeit der Personen”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47,
p. 368.
239. This subject is at the centre of the new bilateral negotiations between Switzerland and
the EC, supra note 46.
240. De Groot, supra note 206, para 110, 114. Conventions for the avoidance of double
taxation or internal taxation law may not contain methods of calculation discriminating either
directly or indirectly on grounds of nationality. A proportionality factor that only takes into
account personal tax advantages and tax-free amounts with regard to the revenue earned in
the residence State without considering that the other States where professional activity has
occurred do not treat personal and family circumstances when taxing the income, therefore
violates Art. 39 EC.
241. De Groot, supra note 206, para 75 et seq., para 94.
242. According to Art. 22(1) AFMP, such agreements concern private individuals, economic
operators, cross-border cooperation or local frontier traffic.
243. Art. 22(2) AFMP.
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4.6. Joint and Unilateral Declarations
The Contracting Parties have attached Joint Declarations to the Final Act of the
AFMP and take note of Unilateral Declarations. The Joint Declarations refer
to the general liberalization of service provisions, to retirement pensions of
former employees of EC institutions resident in Switzerland, to the application
of the Agreement, and to further negotiations. The Unilateral Declarations
of Switzerland concern the renewal of the Agreement, the migration and
asylum policy244 and the recognition of architects’ diplomas. The Unilateral
Declarations of the EC and the EU Member States refer to Articles 1 (on entry
and exit) and 17 (on persons providing services) of Annex I, and to Swiss
attendance at Joint Committees.
5. The Agreement on Air Transport (AAT)
5.1. Aims and contents
The AAT governs access of Swiss airlines to the liberalized European aviation
market on the basis of reciprocity.245 This access is granted step by step: the
3rd and 4th freedom (e.g. Zurich-Paris or Paris-Zurich respectively) coming
into effect together with the Agreement, the 5th and 7th freedom (e.g. Zurich-
Paris-Madrid or Paris-London respectively) two years later. Negotiations on
granting the 8th freedom (so-called “cabotage”, that is domestic flights oper-
ated by a foreign airline) will be commenced five years after coming into
effect of the Agreement.246 As stated in Article 15(2) AAT, the traffic rights
are granted to Community and Swiss air carriers which have their principal
place of business and, if any, their registered office in the Community respect-
ively in Switzerland and which are licensed according to the provisions of
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2407/92. A Community air carrier needs to
meet the requirements of the genuine link clause of Article 3 of Council Reg-
ulation (EEC) No. 2407/92, demanding a 50% Community ownership. The
rule for Swiss ownership is determined by Article 52(2) lit. c of the Swiss
Aviation Act which delegates the specification of the conditions to the Federal
244. In order to reinforce cooperation in these areas, “Switzerland is willing to participate
in the EU system for coordinating asylum applications, and it proposes that negotiations be
entered into for the conclusion of a convention parallel to the Dublin Convention”.
245. It also concerns the Swiss individuals through the inclusion of Council Regulations
(EC) 2027/97 (O.J. 1997, L 285/1) and 295/91 (O.J. 1991, L 36/5) on the responsibility of
Airlines towards their passengers: Dettling-Ott, “Auswirkungen des Luftverkehrsabkommens
auf die Rechtsstellung der Passagiere”, in Cottier and Oesch, supra note 77, p. 83 et seq.
246. Art. 15 AAT; FJ 1999, 6150.
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Council.247 Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited, and
Swiss natural and legal persons are on a par with European persons, which
means that they obtain freedom of establishment and investment.248
5.2. The AAT as a partial integration agreement
Contrary to the other sectoral agreements, the AAT is not governed by tradi-
tional public international law alone but extends the applicable EC competi-
tion law regarding air transport to Switzerland.249 The distinct character of the
AAT as a so-called partial integration agreement250 is evident especially in the
area of legal protection. According to Article 11(1) AAT, Community institu-
tions, including the Commission and the ECJ, receive far-reaching supervision
and control competences in the area of competition law, i.e. Articles 8 and 9
AAT. Therefore, in the field of air transport, supranational European compet-
ition law is also applicable in Switzerland, which constitutes a considerable
intervention into the sovereignty of Switzerland within this limited area. The
competition law provisions of Article 8 and 9 match Article 81 and 82 EC.251
According to Article 8 AAT, agreements and behaviour limiting competition,
such as price fixing and market division, are prohibited. This prohibition,
however, does not apply automatically because of Article 8(3) AAT: it is pos-
sible to declare such agreements legal, if they contribute to the furtherance
of technical and scientific progress and thereby adequately take the interests
of consumers into account because there is still sufficient competition on the
247. Swiss Act on Aviation of 21 Dec. 1948 (SC 748.0). Its Art. 52(2) lit. c also transfers to
the Federal Council the competence to conclude international treaties that regulate the rights
of foreign citizens in this regard. The Federal Council has passed the Regulation on Aviation
of 14 Nov. 1973, SC 780.01, and specified the requirements for ownership in Arts. 4 and
5. According to Art. 4 the exclusive owners of the aircraft must be either a Swiss citizen, a
foreign citizen who has an equal status due to an international treaty, or a foreign citizen with
a long-term Swiss residence permit who uses the aircraft usually starting from Switzerland.
Corporate bodies need to have their seat in Switzerland and must be registered there, only
associations have to be incorporated according to Swiss law and two thirds of their members
and their board as well as their president are required to reside in Switzerland being either
Swiss nationals or foreigners with an equal status based on an international agreement. Art 5
excludes fiduciary rights of disposal from the meaning of ownership.
248. Art. 4 AAT; FJ 1999, 6150 et seq.
249. FJ 1999, 6150.
250. FJ 1999, 6156; cf. e.g. Haldimann “Grundzu¨ge des Abkommens u¨ber den Luftverkehr”,
in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 459 et seq.; Hirsbrunner, supra note 133, p. 464;
Za¨ch, supra note 55, p. 7; for Felder, supra note 55, p. 125 et seq., and Cottier and Evtimov,
supra note 55, p. 89, it is an integration agreement; cf. also the authors referred to supra note
116.
251. See also Dettling-Ott, “Abkommen u¨ber den Luftverkehr”, in Thu¨rer et al., supra note
47, p. 468 et seq.; Hirsbrunner, supra note 133.
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routes in question. Article 9 AAT, on the other hand, strictly prohibits abuse
of a market-dominating position.
According to Article 11(1) AAT, the Community institutions thus apply and
enforce the provisions of Article 8 and 9 AAT,252 with the exceptions men-
tioned above, and they examine mergers with consequences for the European
Union. Switzerland is thereby obliged to enable the competent Community
institutions to conduct inquiries regarding competition and antitrust laws in
the area of civil aviation on Swiss territory, which requires the creation of a
legal basis in Swiss antitrust law. Such control and supervision competences
of the Commission and the ECJ do not exist in the area of government aid, they
remain a power of each Contracting Party, as Article 14 states explicitly.253
With regard to the proper enforcement of the AAT, each Contracting Party
shall be responsible on its own territory.254 However, Article 18(2) AAT
states an important exception to the principle of territoriality for the precisely
defined area of traffic rights as provided for in Chapter 3 AAT:255 whenever
Council Regulations No. 2407/92 and 2408/92256 contain competences of
the EC institutions towards the Member States, these powers shall also be
enjoyed with regard to Switzerland.257 Due to this dynamic reference, the
new European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)258 would clearly be able to
252. The Federal Council has formulated a message that suggests an adaptation of the
Antitrust law (SC 251) to the new control mechanisms provided for in the AAT: FJ 2002, 5506.
253. FJ 1999, 6256. Art. 13(2) lit. a AAT, concerning aid having a social character granted
to individual consumers without discrimination, and lit. b on aid to make good the damage
caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, even state a compatibility with the
AAT; also aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living
is abnormally low or where there is serious under-employment (Art. 13(3) lit. a AAT), aid
to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy
a serious disturbance in the economy of a Contracting Party (lit. b) and aid to facilitate the
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does
not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest (lit. c), is
allowed. Switzerland considers that much criticized former governmental aid for SWISSAIR
does not come under the competence of the Joint Committee; cf. Bulletin Quotidien Europe
No. 8366/2002, p. 17.
254. Art. 18(1) AAT; FJ 1999, 6257.
255. Art. 18(2) AAT explicitly refers to the authorization of air services in Chapter 3 AAT.
256. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2407/92 of 23 July 1992 on licensing of air carriers (O.J.
1992, L 240/1) and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 (O.J. 1992, L
240/8) on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes. Within the AAT
they are part of the so-called “third liberalization-package”, qualified by the Federal Council
as the most substantial innovations of the Agreement: FJ 1999, 6261. In addition to their high
relevance in practice, they are of a self-executing nature: FJ 1999, 6259 et seq.
257. FJ 1999, 6257. See in general Haldimann, supra note 250, p. 451, and Dettling-Ott,
supra note 251, p. 473.
258. Regulation (EC) No. 1592/02 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July
2002 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety
Agency, O.J. 2002, L 240/1.
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take decisions that are binding for Switzerland, too, whether it is a member
of EASA or not,259 but only within the restricted scope of Article 18(2) AAT.
Thus, limitations on landing rights for environmental reasons260 are excluded
from the control mechanism of Article 18(2) AAT.
According to Article 10 AAT, examination competences of the Commission
do not extend to facts relating exclusively to Switzerland or having an exclus-
ive effect on routes with third countries. For this, Swiss antitrust authorities
are solely competent. According to Article 11(2) AAT, they thereby apply
Article 8 and 9 AAT, and, therefore, indirectly the European provisions of
Article 81 and 82 ECT.
Article 20 AAT provides for an exclusive competence of the ECJ to rule
on the validity of decisions of Community institutions. Therefore, a company
domiciled in Switzerland can only appeal to the CFI and the ECJ as Com-
munity institutions for transnational competition disputes in the sense of the
AAT. This applies only to the more or less voluntary willingness of companies
based in Switzerland to cooperate, but not to execution orders by the police
or orders that interfere with basic rights261 within the scope of examination
measures of the Swiss Competition Commission,262 against which an appeal
is possible to the Appeals Commission for Competition Matters. Against
execution orders by this Commission and its secretariat, domestic legal rem-
edies are also open to companies in Switzerland, that is the complaint to
the Appeals Commission for Competition Matters according to the Law on
Administrative Proceedings263 and the Antitrust Law264 as well as a further
appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
Switzerland has added to the Final Act to the AAT a declaration on a
possible change in the statute or in procedural rules of the ECJ.265 With
respect to the possibility to take legal action against Swiss airlines as well as
Switzerland itself, the Swiss Government expressed its wish that if a change
should occur, in which lawyers admitted in a country with a similar agreement
as the one at hand are allowed to appear in front of the ECJ, such a possibility
259. This is good reason to recommend participation of Switzerland in the EASA, because
then it could take part in the decision-making or decision-shaping process.
260. Art. 18(2) AAT. The basis for such measures can be either Art. 8(2) or (9) of Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 2408/92. Cf. Dettling-Ott, supra note 251, p. 473; Haldimann, supra
note 250, p. 451.
261. See also Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, Hoechst v. Commission, [1989] ECR 2859.
262. See www.wettbewerbskommission.ch
263. Art. 45 Law on Administrative Proceedings (SC 172.021).
264. Art. 43 Antitrust Law (SC 251).
265. Final Act of the AAT, Declaration by Switzerland on a possible amendment to the
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, O.J. 2002, L 114/90.
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to appear in matters brought before the Court according to this Agreement
should also be created for Swiss lawyers admitted in Switzerland.266
6. The Agreement on the Carriage of Goods and Passengers by Rail
and Road (ARR)
6.1. Aims and contents
The goals and contents of the Agreement on Rail and Road Transport267 are
the following:
– more efficient traffic management, which is technically, geographically and
economically most suitable to the transport modes covered by the Agreement,
by means of reciprocal opening of the transport market for the carriage of
goods and passengers by road and rail, step by step;268
– reciprocity and free choice of mode of transport;269
– prohibition of discrimination;270
– co-ordinated transport policy271 between Switzerland and the EU with the
goals of sustainable mobility, environmental protection, comparability of con-
ditions and avoidance of detours by traffic;272
266. FJ 1999, 6970.
267. See also Ambu¨hl, “Zur Konzeption der koordinierten Verkehrspolitik”, in Felder and
Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 514 et seq.; Epiney and Sollberger, supra note 16, p. 21 et seq.;
Schneuwly, “Principales caracte´ristiques de l’Accord sur les transports de marchandises et de
voyageurs par rail et par route”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 493 et seq.; Weber
and Friedli, “Abkommen u¨ber den Gu¨ter- und Personenverkehr auf Schiene und Strasse”, in
Thu¨rer et al., supra note 47, p. 391 et seq.
268. Art. 1(1) ARR.
269. Art. 1(2) ARR. Critical point of view hold by Epiney, supra note 59, no. 16 et seq, 18;
Epiney and Sollberger, supra note 16, p. 22 et seq.
270. Art. 1(3) ARR. As to its character as a non-self-executing provision, see supra section
3.1.3. The Joint Committee is currently discussing whether the priority for regional traffic when
according access to the Gotthard tunnel is discriminatory. As far as the territory of Austria
is concerned, Art. 11 ARR introduces a system of ecopoints for Swiss operators, which is
equivalent to Art. 11 of Protocol No. 9 of the Act of Accession to Austria to the EU concerning
EU operators.
271. Title IV ARR. Cf. Epiney and Sollberger, “Zum Gestaltungsspielraum der Vertrags-
parteien: die rechtliche Tragweite des Art. 32 des Abkommens u¨ber den Gu¨ter- und Personen-
verkehr auf Schiene und Strasse”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 522 et seq.; Weber
and Friedli, supra note 267, p. 409 et seq.; Epiney, supra note 59, no. 19 et seq., 22, is not
convinced that the Communities fulfil their own requirements with regard to environmental
protection in the fields of transport policy.
272. See Epiney, supra note 59, no. 5 et seq., who thinks that the conflict of interests between
Switzerland and the EC or some specific Member States was profound and a compromise very
difficult to reach. According to Epiney and Sollberger, supra note 16, p. 66 et seq., Switzerland
has in the end given up much room for manoeuvre.
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– more and fairer competition between and within the two modes of trans-
portation, road and rail;
– partial supplementation and continuation of the Agreement on Transit (term
until 2005);273
– gradual bringing into line of Swiss law with European provisions regarding
technical control and maximum weight for heavy goods vehicles (HGVs);
– competitive supply of rail services in the Alpine region (shift of traffic from
the road to the railroad track)274;
– increased taxation parallel to the increase of maximum weight through
a stepwise introduction of a system of fees based on a “polluter pays”
principle,275 i.e. differentiated according to emission categories;
– retention of the current prohibition on night trips for HGVs between 22.00
and 5.00 (easing of border formalities such as processing before 5.00). In
addition, the ARR contains three different safeguard clauses.276
Swiss home trade, which refers to any transnational carriage of goods or
passengers within the geographical scope of the Agreement by a vehicle
registered in Switzerland, will be totally deregulated from 2005 on.277
6.2. Content and significance of the protection clauses
The ARR contains the three following so-called “corrective measures": a
unilateral fiscal safeguard clause in Article 46 ARR, a consensual safeguard
clause in Article 47 ARR and special crisis measures in Article 48 ARR.278
273. Cf. Epiney and Sollberger, supra note 16, p. 26.
274. On 20 Feb. 1994, the Swiss citizens accepted a people’s constitutional initiative for the
protection of the Alpine region which includes the obligation to realize this shift: FJ 1994 II
696. It led to Art. 84 and 196(1) of the Federal Consitution, providing for 10 years to complete
this aim. See on its compatibility with the Transit Agreement: Ru¨tsche, “Alpeninitiative und
Transitabkommen”, in Ru¨tsche and Sollberger, “Verkehrspolitik und Alpenraum”, SPEI, vol.
6, (1996), p. 6 et seq., 10 et seq., 16 et seq.
275. From 2005, the following regulations will apply: increase of the maximum weight to 40
tons and a fee of CHF 297 (EUR 180; weighted average) for transits on the axis Basel-Chiasso
(300 km). After the beginning of operation of the first NEAT tunnel at Lo¨tschberg, but on 1
Jan. 2008 at the latest, the fee will be increased to CHF 325–330 (EUR 200). Adjustment to
inflation will be made every other year after 2007, if the average inflation between entering into
force of the Agreement and 31 Dec. 2004 is above 2%, there will be an adjustment in 2005 as
well. As to decisions on collecting fees and allocating infrastructure capacity in international
rail transport, the States shall ensure a possibility for appeal before an independent body, Art.
29 ARR. Cf. Cottier and Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 90 et seq.
276. See infra under 4.2. et seq.
277. Art. 12 ARR.
278. The clauses are contained in part E of title IV concerning coordinated traffic policy. See
also Weber and Friedli, supra note 267, p. 423 et seq.
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6.2.1. The unilateral fiscal safeguard clause (Art. 46 ARR)
Article 46 ARR gives Switzerland a right to apply unilateral fiscal safeguard
measures. This instrument can be applied efficiently to increase the transit
price in a strictly established procedure up to a fixed level in the case of an
insufficient use of the rail capacity.279 Switzerland may raise the toll provided
for in Article 40(4) ARR by a maximum 12.5% as long as the following five
preconditions are cumulatively met:280
– difficulties with Swiss trans-alpine road traffic flows continue after 1 Janu-
ary 2005;
– the average rate of utilization of the rail capacity in Switzerland (accompan-
ied and unaccompanied combined transport) is less than 66% over a ten-week
period;
– rail prices are competitive;
– the measures under Article 36 ARR regarding quality parameters are applied
correctly;
– scope and duration of the measures are limited to whatever is strictly neces-
sary to remedy the situation (a first extension for six months is possible, a
further one only if the Joint Committee agrees).
Moreover, the Joint Committee must be informed before application of
the corrective measures, and measures may only be introduced at the earliest
30 days after the notification to the Joint Committee, save where the latter
decides otherwise.281
A later renewed application of such safeguard measures must comply with
the following conditions:
– where the previous measures did not last longer than six months, further
measures may be taken only after a period of twelve months from the date of
cessation of the previous measures;282
– where the previous measures exceeded six months, further measures may
be taken only after a period of eighteen months from the date of cessation of
the previous measures;283
– safeguard measures may never be introduced more than twice within five
years of the date on which such measures were first introduced.284
Exceptions to these requirements can be decided by the Joint Committee by
mutual agreement under special circumstances.285 For its part, the EC “may,
279. Cf. Ambu¨hl, supra note 267, p. 516 et seq.; Friedli, “Das Abkommen u¨ber den Gu¨ter-
und Personenverkehr auf Schiene und Strasse: eine politische Wu¨rdigung”, in Felder and
Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 481 et seq., 486; Schneuwly, supra note 267, p. 491 et seq., 506.
280. Art. 46(1) ARR.
281. Art. 46(4) ARR.
282. Art. 46(3) lit. b subpara. 2 obl. 1 ARR.
283. Art. 46(3) lit. b subpara. 2 obl. 2 ARR.
284. Art. 46(3) lit. b subpara. 2 obl. 3 ARR.
285. Art. 46(3) lit. b subpara. 3 ARR.
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subject to comparable conditions, take similar corrective measures”.286 In
all cases, conditional revenues resulting from the increase in charges “shall
be used to help make rail and combined transport more competitive vis-a`-
vis road transport”.287 Such unilateral measures, if in correspondence with
aims and principles of the ARR, can in the opinion of the Federal Council
theoretically already be taken from 1 January 2005 on, but in reality, they are
only feasible with the full utilization of the Swiss toll, meaning at the earliest
from the inauguration of the first basis tunnel on. Beside the additional rise
of the toll through unilateral fiscal protection measures, Switzerland still has
the possibility to reduce artificially the price of the railway via the resolution
of purposeful subsidies, first of all through a cheaper price of the marked-out
route.
6.2.2. The consensual safeguard clause (Art. 47 ARR)
The Joint Committee can, by mutual agreement and corresponding to a clearly
defined procedure, take fiscal or non-fiscal measures (driving ban, quantitative
limits, etc.) if the attainment of the objectives set out in Article 30 ARR is
prejudiced.288 There must be a meeting of the Joint Committee within 15 days
of one Contracting Party’s request being submitted.289 The traffic observatory
must be informed immediately, and should report within 14 days on the
situation and on any measures to be taken.290 Taking account of this report –
and within 60 days of its first meeting on the matter – the Joint Committee
then decides on the measures to be taken; this period can be extended by
mutual agreement.291 The measures must be limited in scope and duration, to
whatever is strictly necessary to remedy the situation. They should interfere
as little as possible with the operation of the ARR.292
6.2.3. Special crisis measures (Art. 48 ARR)
In cases of force majeure, the Contracting Parties must take all possible
concerted action to restore and maintain the flow of traffic. Priority is to be
given to sensitive cargoes.
286. Art. 46(2) ARR.
287. Art. 46(1) ARR.
288. Art. 47(1) ARR.
289. Art. 47(2) ARR.
290. Art. 47(1) ARR.
291. Art. 47(2) ARR.
292. Art. 47(3) ARR.
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7. The Agreement on Trade in Agricultural products (ATAP)
7.1. Aims and contents
The ATAP provides for tariff concessions and the removal of technical
barriers,293 so that trade in non-processed agricultural products between
Switzerland and the EU can be further liberalized and access to each oth-
er’s markets be improved.294
7.1.1. “Quantitative improvements”
These concern tariff concessions, such as reduction or abolition of customs
duties, establishment of customs quotas, etc.295 Annexes 1 to 3 of the ATAP,
which are not directly applicable,296 list the sectors concerned; thereby the
emphasis is on cheese products.297 For these, reciprocal free market access
will be introduced after a transition period of five years. This is to be achieved
by a gradual increase in quantities exempted from customs duties, a gradual
reduction of export subsidies by Switzerland (no EU export subsidies from
the beginning) and a reciprocal stepwise elimination of import duties. In
addition, the Agreement entails easing of customs duties for vegetables, fruit
and horticultural products, and special meats.
7.1.2. “Qualitative improvements”
This area concerns removing technical barriers to trade. The Agreement is
generally based on the principle of mutual recognition in relation to the
equality of legislation.298 Annexes 4 to 11 contain regulations on the sectoral
differentiated product categories.299
293. Arts. 1(1), (2) and (4) AAP.
294. Today 75% of Switzerland’s agricultural imports come from the EC. FJ 1999, 6149, 6227
et seq. See also Senti, “Abkommen u¨ber den Handel mit landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen”,
in Thu¨rer et al., supra note 47, p. 581 et seq.
295. FJ 1999, 6149, 6227 et seq.
296. FJ 1999, 6229. Reference is made to the obligations of the GATT / WTO Uruguay
Round and the corresponding message of the Federal Council of 19 Sept. 1994, FJ 1994 IV
1011. See also for Swiss case law supra notes 75 and 76.
297. See Aebi, Bo¨tsch, Fe´lix, Ha¨berli, Markstein, Pohl, Rothen, Schauenberg, Zuber, “Das
Abkommen u¨ber den Handel mit landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen: eine politische und
wirtschaftliche Wu¨rdigung”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 586 et seq.
298. FJ 1999, 6150.
299. In the veterinary sector and in the fields of plant health, animal food, seeds and organic-
ally produced foodstuffs, the equivalence of control systems will be recognized within a large
area. Not included are fish and meat products as well as eggs. Switzerland plans to modify
its law on foodstuffs (SC 817.0) in order to harmonize the legislation and thereby make an
extension to these sectors possible (FJ 1999, 6237, 6243, 6246 et seq.), according to the gen-
eral evolutionary clause in Art. 13 ATAP. Existing names of origin will be protected in the
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8. The Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ASTC)
The ASTC secures participation of Switzerland in the 5th Research and Tech-
nological Development Framework Programme (FP5)300 on the same terms
as a Member State of the EEA. It also includes the research programme of
EURATOM, the so-called “Nuclear Framework Programme”.301 Participa-
tion was scheduled for FP5, but this programme was already terminated on
31 December 2002. The fixed time limit was valid also for the ASTC302 and
is the reason why the conclusion of a new agreement with regard to FP6
is needed.303 Since this necessity was foreseen during the negotiations, a
prolongation was planed for the next FP.304
The parties agreed that, on the one hand, Swiss research entities and sci-
entists can participate in all specific programmes of the FP5 as equals.305
Switzerland from now on takes part in the different research committees of
the FP as an observer306 and is allowed to coordinate projects.307 On the other
hand, EU research entities (universities, research organizations, companies,
individuals) can participate in Swiss research programmes and projects under
the following conditions: Swiss regulations on participation need to be met,
administrative costs must be shared, and the assent of the project leader and
sectors of spirits and wine (Annex 8 ATAP). A compromise was found for the name “Grappa":
Swiss spirits from the italophone region are allowed to be called “Grappa” if they fulfil EC
requirements for this speciality (FJ 1999, 6236). Cf. Switzerland’s Declaration on Grappa in
the Final Act of the ATAP. See also Aebi and others, supra note 297, p. 600 et seq. A conflict
about the Swiss wine “Champagne” is related to Art. 5(8) of Annex 7 ATAP, where the name
“Champagne” will be reserved exclusively for a French region in 2004. It led to a claim by
Swiss wine-growers against Commission and Council, which is currently pending at the CFI
and which is based on the argument of a violation of general legal principles and the principle
of proportionality: Case T-212/02, Commune de Champagne and others v. Commission; cf.
also O.J. 2002, C 2002, 27; Bulletin Quotidien Europe No. 8315/2002, p. 16; FJ 1999, 6235;
see critical view by Senti, supra note 294, p. 623 et seq., 627.
300. O.J. 1999, L 26/1; FJ 2003, 861.
301. O.J. 1999, L 26/34; FJ 2003, 861.
302. Art. 14(2) ASTC in conjunction with the preamble: 31 Dec. 2002.
303. The renewed ASTC has been initialled on 5 Sept. 2003, and will come into force on
1 Jan. 2004 on a provisional basis even before signature and internal ratification; cf. Neue
Zu¨rcher Zeitung, No. 206, 6–7 Sept. 2003.
304. O.J. 2002, L 232, in (2003) Zeitschrift fu¨r Europarecht, 14; FJ 1999, 6146, 6195. The
Joint Committee prepared the negotiations; FJ 2003, 861; cf. in general Kleiber, “Politique
scientifique internationale et coope´ration scientifique en Europe”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra
note 47, p. 684 et seq.; von Arb, “Grundzu¨ge des Abkommens u¨ber die wissenschaftliche und
technische Zusammenarbeit”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 690 et seq.
305. Cf. Schenker-Wicki and Holzer, “Abkommen u¨ber die wissenschaftliche und technolo-
gische Zusammenarbeit”, in Thu¨rer et al., supra note 47, p. 647 et seq.
306. The legal status of Switzerland is not identical to that of the EFTA States, but to that of
associated countries that are applying for membership in the EU/EC: FJ 1999, 6195.
307. FJ 1999, 6192, 6194.
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the person responsible for programme management must be given.308 The fin-
ancial contribution of Switzerland will be calculated on the basis of the gross
domestic product309 in comparison with one of the 15 EU Member States.310
If the FP5 is modified or expanded within the first three months, Switzerland
can terminate its participation with a period of notice of six months. In this
specific case, the “guillotine clause” will not be applied.311
With regard to intellectual property, research entities participating in the
other Contracting Party’s project shall have the same rights and obligations.312
9. The Agreement on Certain Aspects of Government Procurement
(AGP)
9.1. Aims and contents
The principal goal of this Agreement is to create better access conditions to the
procurement markets, which are important sectors, representing about 720 bil-
lion EURO for the EU and approximately 24 billion EURO for Switzerland.313
The AGP aims at mutual expansion and broadening of the scope of liberal-
ization of public procurement markets reached in the Government Procure-
ment Agreement (GPA) within the frame of the World Trade Organization
(WTO)314, for the following areas:315
– railroad traffic and telecommunications;
– the entire energy sectors;
– inclusion of private contracting entities in the classic sectors of water and
308. FJ 1999, 6194.
309. Reference should be the latest statistical data from the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Art. 5(2)(2) ASTC.
310. The programme concerning nuclear fusion is excluded. FJ 1999, 6196. Art. 5(2) ASTC.
Annex B gives detailed rules regarding Switzerland’s financial contribution.
311. FJ 1999, 6146, 6195; Art. 9(1) ASTC.
312. Art. 4 ASTC. Annex A provides for guiding principles on the allocation of intellectual
property rights. Its Art. 2 requires treatment consistent with the TRIPS Agreement of the
GATT-WTO, the Berne Convention (Paris Act 1971) and the Paris Convention (Stockholm
Act 1967). Cf. Schenker-Wicki and Holzer, supra note 305, p. 652 et seq.; Cottier and Evtimov,
supra note 55, p. 83.
313. FJ 1999, 6148.
314. O.J. 1994, L 336/290; SC 0.632.231.422. As provided for in Art. 145 AGP, the Agree-
ment shall not affect rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties under agreements con-
cluded under the auspices of the WTO. According to Arts. 1 and 2 AGP, the Communities’ and
Switzerland’s Annexes and General Notes to Annex 1 of the GPA must be amended within a
month of the entry into force of the Agreement. Cf. Bollinger, “Grundzu¨ge des Abkommens
u¨ber bestimmte Aspekte des o¨ffentlichen Beschaffungswesens”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra
note 47, p. 643 et seq.
315. FJ 1999, 6147, 6202 et seq.; FJ 2002, 860; Art. 3(5) AGP.
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energy supply, urban transport, sea ports and airports;
– inclusion of further contracting entities in the traffic sectors (e.g. cable rail-
ways, ski-lifts);
– inclusion of municipalities and districts in the scope of the GPA (only
between the EU and Switzerland; suppliers from other GPA Member States
are not entitled to have access to procurements of Swiss municipalities).316
In sectors, such as telecommunications, which are in a process of lib-
eralization and which demonstrably function under competitive conditions,
businesses can be freed from the procurement regulations.317 The Agree-
ment is based on the assumptions that the two legal systems are equivalent
and that mutual market access is comparable.318 Therefore, the principle
of non-discrimination is provided for, containing the principles of most-
favoured-nation and national treatment.319 Further fundamental principles
are transparency and fairness.320 Detailed lists of the entities concerned are
contained in Annexes I-IV AGP; the services covered by the Agreement are
listed in Annex VI.321 Switzerland has stated several exceptions in Annex
VIII. The Agreement also provides for mutual exchange of information
on tender notices, relevant legislation322 and mutual access to correspond-
ing databases.323 Control of compliance with the duties stemming from the
Agreement324 is exercised by an independent commission composed of the
European Communities Commission and Swiss representatives. Both parties
316. Cf. Wasescha, “Das Abkommen u¨ber bestimmte Aspekte des o¨ffentlichen Beschaf-
fungswesens: eine Wu¨rdigung aus politischer und wirtschaftspolitischer Sicht”, in Felder and
Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 637 et seq. On the experiences of the cantons with the AGP see May-
er, “Erfahrungen der Kantone mit dem Abkommen u¨ber bestimmte Aspekte des o¨ffentlichen
Beschaffungswesens”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 669 et seq.
317. Art. 3(5) AGP; FJ 1999, 6147 et seq., 6205 et seq.; FJ 2002, 860: Switzerland has
announced in the Joint Committee that it will exclude the telecommunication sector on the
basis of this provision.
318. Therefore harmonization or taking over of law is not provided for in the AGP; Zimmerli,
“Auswirkungen auf das o¨ffentliche Beschaffungswesen”, in Cottier and Oesch, supra note 77,
p. 162.
319. FJ 1999, 6206; Art. 6 AGP; Annex X AGP contains a list of examples of behaviour
which is direct or indirect discrimination within the definition of the Agreement.
320. Arts. 3(1), 4(1) AGP.
321. Beside services in the field of construction, which are contained in Annex VII AGP. See
also Biaggini, “Abkommen u¨ber bestimmte Aspekte des o¨ffentlichen Beschaffungswesens”,
in Thu¨rer et al., supra note 47, p. 351 et seq.
322. Names and addresses of these so-called “contact points” need to be communicated by
the Contracting Parties (Art. 7(3) AGP).
323. FJ 1999, 6208; Switzerland already took part in the EU project SIMAP, terminated
in 1998, which worked out a data system for public markets; Art. 12 AGP on information
technology.
324. Art. 8 AGP on the monitoring authority.
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provide legal remedies for breaches of contract which also exist in the frame-
work of the GPA.325
As for the compatibility of the AGP with WTO law, problems may be
seen with regard to the most-favoured-nation clause and the requirements for
preferential agreements.326
9.2. Legal protection
The AGP contains detailed legal protection provisions in Article 5 and Annex
V. While Article 5 is not self-executing, paragraph 1 of Annex V is. According
to this provision, access to independent and impartial courts, public proceed-
ings, time limits for challenges of no less than 10 days as well as other specific
requirements with regard to due process of law have to be guaranteed. Para-
graphs 2 and 3, which are not directly applicable, concern in particular interim
measures and the consequences of unlawful decisions.
An exception to the principle of non-discrimination exists for Switzerland
with regard to cantonal legal remedies, which are not available to EU suppliers
below the threshold level because Article 6(3) AGP is only a best-endeavour
clause.327
Disputes between the Contracting parties about the application of the
Agreement can be settled by the Joint Committee,328 which is established by
Article 11 AGP. The Joint Committee also periodically checks the Annexes
and decides by general consent about their adaptation if one Contracting Party
so requests.
325. Arts. XX and XXII of the Government Procurement Agreement. Cf. Cottier and
Evtimov, supra note 55, p. 84 et seq.
326. Cf. Cottier and Panizzon, supra note 47, no. 27 et seq. The authors think that a general
evaluation is limited and only concrete cases allow precise analysis. The Federal Council
has taken into consideration this question regarding each sectoral agreement and sees no
contradiction with the WTO obligations: FJ 1999, 6430 et seq; critical view held by Cottier,
“Das Ende der bilateralen ¨Ara: rechtliche Auswirkungen der WTO auf die Integrationspolitik
der Schweiz”, in Cottier and Kospe, supra note 71, p. 103 et seq., who argues that the scope
for sectoral bilateral agreements remains limited, due to the requirements of WTO law.
327. FJ 1999, 6147, 6206 et seq.; see the explanatory notification in Annex IX B AGP; cf.
also Thu¨rer and Hillemanns, supra note 50, p. 31 et seq.; Bollinger, supra note 314, p. 653 et
seq.
328. Art. 10 AGP.
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10. The Agreement on Mutual Recognition in relation to Conformity
Assessment (MRA)
10.1. Aims and contents
In order to avoid duplication of procedures, this agreement on technical barri-
ers to trade grants mutual acceptance of the results of conformity assessment
(tests, reports, authorizations, conformity marks, certificates, manufacturer’s
declarations of conformity), which means a systematic examination to determ-
ine the extent to which an industrial product, process or service fulfils specified
requirements by the laws of the EU and Switzerland.329 According to the pre-
amble, the Contracting Parties wish to facilitate trade by eliminating technical
barriers330 and to ensure protection for health, safety, the environment and
consumers. The Agreement is designed to reduce the time and costs for mar-
keting products originating from the other Contracting Party, and to equalize
market access conditions for them.331 It reinforces the “global approach” by
taking into consideration the recommendations of the WTO Agreement on
Technical Barriers to trade.
Article 1 MRA states the general principle of mutual recognition which is
effected at two levels:332
– if the Swiss legislation differs from that of the Communities, conformity
assessment shall be made on basis of the other Contracting Party (export
destination).333 Thus, only one conformity assessment body is needed for the
controls concerning EC and Swiss standards;
– if, according to the MRA, standards are considered by the Joint
Committee334 to be equal, conformity assessment can be made on basis
of only one legislation and is then accepted by the other Contracting Party
without any need for a new evaluation.335
The scope of the Agreement is limited to end-products originating in the
Contracting Parties.336 However, if products are covered by agreements on
mutual recognition in relation to conformity assessment between Switzerland
and Member States of both EFTA and EEA, products of EFTA States shall
329. See e.g. Arioli, “Der Abbau von technischen Handelshemmnissen”, in Cottier and
Oesch, supra note 77, p. 124 et seq.
330. See also FJ 1999, 6148, 6212. Cf. Zosso, “Das Abkommen u¨ber die gegenseitige
Anerkennung von Konformita¨tsbewertungen: eine politische und wirtschaftliche Wu¨rdigung”,
in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 553 et seq.
331. FJ 1999, 6149, 6213.
332. Cf. FJ 1999, 6214.
333. Art. 1(1) MRA.
334. Art. 1(3) MRA referring to Art. 10 MRA.
335. Art. 1(2) MRA.
336. Art. 4(1) MRA.
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also be covered.337 The product sectors concerned by the MRA are set out
in Annex I.338 Annex II provides for general principles for designating con-
formity assessment bodies. A verification of compliance of these bodies can
be demanded by the Contracting Parties.339
The Joint Committee established by Article 10 MRA may modify the
Annexes, keeping the Articles up to date with technical progress.340 It is
responsible for the removal and inclusion of conformity assessment bodies,
as well as for drawing up the procedure for carrying out the verifications
provided for in Articles 7 and 8 MRA.341 The Committee also examines all
notifications made by the Contracting Parties342 and is the dispute settlement
body.343
10.2. Evaluation
The Agreement neither contains a harmonization of regulatory provisions for
putting products into circulation between Switzerland and the EU nor a sys-
tematic recognition of equivalence of national regulations in the sense of the
“Cassis de Dijon” principle.344 Because of the far-reaching euro-compatibility
of Swiss regulations for areas with equivalent Swiss legislation, the proofs of
conformity (tests, certificates etc.) required for Switzerland are valid for mar-
keting in the EU area at the same time, whereby the Agreement goes further
than similar treaties that exist between the EC and the USA345 or Canada.346
Thereby it should be noted that this access, for example in the case of pharma-
ceutical products, only includes certain aspects, such as reciprocal recognition
of inspections by the official manufacturing control or product analysis by
337. Art. 4(2) MRA. Such parallel agreements are planed to ensure even more homogeneity;
cf. preamble MRA and FJ 1999, 6149, 6215.
338. See Hertig, “Grundzu¨ge des Abkommens u¨ber die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Kon-
formita¨tsbewertungen”, in Felder and Kaddous, supra note 47, p. 564 et seq.
339. Art. 8(1) MRA; FJ 1999, 6216.
340. Art. 10(5) MRA; FJ 1999, 6216.
341. Art. 10(4) lit. a-d MRA. The Joint Committee has recently decided on a list of conformity
assessment bodies to be recognized in the scope of the MRA; O.J. 2003, L 56/1.
342. Art. 10(4) lit. e MRA.
343. Art. 14 MRA.
344. This was not the objective of the Swiss Federal Council; see FJ 1999, 6213; cf. also
Bu¨hler, “Abkommen u¨ber die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Konformita¨tsbewertungen”, in
Thu¨rer et al., supra note 47, p. 533; Arioli, supra note 329, p. 144 et seq.; cf. on the “Cassis
de Dijon” principle in general: Breitenmoser and Husheer, supra note 1, no. 910; Craig and de
Bu´rca, supra note 48, p. 604 et seq.; Nicolaysen, supra note 51, p. 49, 67; Streinz, supra note
48, no. 667, 671 et seq., 700 et seq., 738 et seq.; Herdegen, supra note 48, no. 294.
345. Agreement on Mutual Recognition between the European Community and the United
States of America, O.J. 1999, L 31/3.
346. Agreement on Mutual Recognition between the European Community and Canada, O.J.
1998, L 280/3.
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the manufacturer or a public authority, but not an authorization to market new
medicines as such.347 Areas not included by the Agreement are foods, bio
label and bio audit.348
11. Concluding remarks
The seven 1999 sectoral agreements between the EC, its Member States and
Switzerland are, in several respects, a pragmatic solution to a unique problem.
They bridge the gap between the European and the Swiss markets following
the Swiss rejection of participation in the EEA.
With regard to the question of legal nature and structure, the agreements
form part of public international law including some elements of, and ref-
erences to, supranational EC law. By traditional treaty law methods, areas
of substantive matters related to EC law and principles are taken over by a
neighbouring third State which accepts, in these fields, the jurisprudence of
the ECJ either directly or by way of consent within the Joint Committees.
This new form of partial participation in the European process of integra-
tion enables Switzerland to preserve traditional concepts of reciprocity and
sovereignty in general as well as institutional independence.
In legal, economic and political terms, the EC extends with the sectoral
agreements its contractual ties with a weighty trade partner and neighbour in
the centre of Europe, which is a prerequisite and a good basis for the achieve-
ment of further bilateral and sectoral agreements in areas of common interest.
As a consequence, the process of European integration will be strengthened,
since Switzerland takes part as a third State in important, though limited,
areas of the common market and will have first experiences with its practical
functioning. Thus, these sectoral agreements may be seen as important ele-
ments paving the way for a second package of sectoral agreements, which is
already under negotiation.
In comparison with other agreement models which bind the EU to European
and Mediterranean non-member countries, the system of the sectoral agree-
ments might be called a new means of “differentiated integration”, somewhere
between cooperation and integration. Indeed, apart from the AAT, with its
dynamic references to EC law and institutions, this is not as far-reaching
as the EEA, with its supranational institutions and automatic taking-over of
the future acquis communautaire. Nevertheless, it does go further than usual
association agreements or a pure trade union such as that with Turkey. With
the experience of such rather specific and pragmatic agreements, Switzer-
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land may now prepare and follow the path towards EU membership, which
still remains the “strategic objective” of its European policy.349 The growing
integration of a remaining “island” on the European map is for many reasons
certainly also a long-term aim of the EU.
Nevertheless, it is hard to predict what impact the sectoral agreements
will have. Since the twofold nature and structure of the agreements with
both public international and EC law involved leaves no room for common
and judicial organs, there is a risk that identical provisions and rights might
be applied and interpreted in different or even contradictory ways. In this
respect, the Joint Committees cannot be a valuable alternative. Furthermore,
according to the parallelism of the seven agreements based on the so-called
“guillotine clauses”, there is a permanent threat of a sudden interruption and
an end to this kind of sectoral approach. One may fear, therefore, that such a
risk will not create an atmosphere of confidence and trust for all participants
at the legal, economic and political levels.
These last considerations might lead to the final conclusion that sectoral
agreements are not a real or long-term alternative for Switzerland to further
steps towards European integration in the future or even a bright model for
other European states. Nevertheless, they may be seen as a helpful interme-
diary or transitional step for a State like Switzerland, which is – for different
reasons of democratic and institutional structures – not yet ready or willing
to embark immediately on the path of European integration together with the
other EU Member States. In the meantime and for the short term, the seven
highly technical sectoral agreements must prove their relevance and value
through their concrete application in practice.
349. Cf. FJ 1992 III 1185; FJ 1994 I 153, 196; FJ 2002, 6359.
